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This paper provides an analysis of how the New Zealand tax system may be affecting 
residential property markets. Like most OECD countries, New Zealand does not tax the 
imputed rent or capital gains from owner-occupied housing. Unlike most OECD 
countries, since 1989 New Zealand has taxed income placed in retirement savings funds 
on an income basis, rather than an expenditure basis. The result is likely to be the most 
distortionary tax policy towards housing in the OECD. Since 1989, these tax distortions 
have provided incentives that should have lead to significant increases in house prices 
and the average size of new dwellings, should have reduced owner-occupier rates, and 
should have led to a worsening of the overseas net asset position. The tax settings are 
likely to be regressive, and are not intergenerationally neutral, as they impose significant 
costs on current and future generations of young New Zealanders (and new migrants).  
Since it does not appear to be politically palatable to tax capital gains or imputed rent, to 
reduce the distortionary consequences of the tax system on housing markets New 
Zealand may wish to reconsider how it taxes retirement savings accounts by adopting the 







New Zealand has one of the most distortionary tax environments for housing markets of 
any country in the OECD. The primary reason is not the failure to tax capital gains or 
the imputed rent from owner-occupied housing (the implicit rent an owner-occupier 
earns from leasing their own house to themselves), for most countries do not tax the 
capital gains or imputed rent from owner-occupied housing. Rather, it is because New 
Zealand taxes income from owner-occupied housing on a different basis than it taxes all 
other capital income. This is not true in most other OECD countries, where owner-
occupied housing is taxed on a similar basis to a wide class of other assets. New Zealand 
and the rest of the OECD have not always been so different. The difference began in 
1989, when New Zealand began taxing funds placed in retirement income accounts on 
an income-tax basis rather than an expenditure-tax basis, but did not change the way it 
taxed owner-occupied housing. 
 
What is the key distinction? Income can either be taxed when it is earned (an income 
tax), or taxed when it is spent (an expenditure tax). Expenditure taxes can take several 
forms, including goods and services taxes and cash-flow taxes. Cash-flow taxes are 
typically implemented by applying a progressive tax to a person’s income adjusted for the 
net purchase and sale of certain assets, on the basis that this total is close to a person’s 
expenditure on consumption goods and services. For example, if someone earned 
$100,000 and saved $15,000 in a retirement account, they would pay tax on $85,000.  
 
Taxes can be distortionary or non-distortionary. Capital income can be classified into 
three classes and if all three classes are taxed consistently on an income or expenditure 
basis the tax system will not distort investment choices. In practice, few tax systems are 
non-distortionary. Most OECD countries adopt an expenditure tax system but only 
provide expenditure tax treatment to two of these classes, for example. The first class is 
earnings that are placed in a government-sanctioned retirement saving fund. In the vast 
majority of OECD countries, these are taxed on an expenditure basis by adopting an 
‘Exempt-Exempt-Taxed’ (EET) rule. Income that is placed in a fund is not taxed when it 
is earned; interest and dividend earnings and any capital gains are not taxed when they 
accumulate in the fund; but when assets are withdrawn from the fund upon retirement, 
they are taxed. The second class is owner-occupied housing. In this case, a prepayment 
or ‘Taxed-Exempt-Exempt’ (TEE) expenditure tax rule is adopted: the house is 
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purchased or paid off from income that is taxed when it is earned, but no tax is paid on 
the imputed rent produced by the property or any capital gain that accrues to the owner. 
The third class is income from any other investments, including leased residential 
housing. This is taxed on an income tax or ‘Taxed-Taxed-Exempt’ (TTE) basis: income 
is taxed when it is first earned; it is taxed as it accumulates; but it is not taxed when it is 
withdrawn and spent. Overall this tax regime distorts against the ‘other’ investment class, 
but because it provides people with the opportunity to hold many classes of investments 
in sanctioned retirement income funds on an equivalent basis as owner-occupied 
housing, it provides few incentives to over-invest in housing.  
 
If a country wishes to tax capital income on a neutral income-tax basis, it needs to do 
three things: tax on retirement income accounts on a “Taxed-Taxed-Exempt” basis; tax 
all capital gains (including those from owner-occupied housing) on an accrual basis; and 
tax the imputed rent from owner-occupied housing. New Zealand attempted to move to 
a non-distortionary income tax system in 1989. However, only the first of the three 
changes were implemented. As a result, rather than eliminating the distortions associated 
with the standard OECD approach, it created a new set of distortions. In particular, 
owner-occupied housing was taxed at much lower rates than other assets, and leased 
residential housing was taxed advantageously relative to debt instruments.  
  
This paper adopts a ‘relative institutions’ approach to analyse the consequences of the 
1989 change. Since 1989, the favourable tax environment for owner-occupied housing 
relative to other assets has provided incentives for households to live in larger houses 
than they otherwise would, and to bid up the price of land in locations that are 
conveniently located to desirable amenities. The favourable tax environment for 
investments in leased residential housing provides incentives for rent/price ratios to fall, 
either through a reduction in rents (if the supply of residential property is elastic) or 
through higher house prices (if the supply of residential property is inelastic.) Home 
owner-ship rates should fall. It is plausible that since 1989 the changes in the tax regime 
have provided incentives for people to increase the size of their houses by 25%, and to 
pay twice as much for land in areas where there is significant transport congestion. 
 
New Zealand’s property markets have changed in a manner consistent with these 
incentives since 1989. The average size of newly constructed houses has increased faster 
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than in Australia or the United States and is amongst the largest in the world. Property 
prices have soared, rent/price ratios have declined sharply, and the number of private 
landlords has increased by more than 300 percent. However, it is not possible to 
definitively attribute these changes to the tax changes, as other factors that affect housing 
markets such as the international decline in interest rates and rising incomes have also 
changed since 1989. The paper attempts regression analysis to unpick the importance of 
the various affects, but concludes it is not possible to estimate the role of the tax 
changes. The evidence is consistent with the conjecture that the tax changes are part of 
the cause of the change, but cannot prove it. 
 
What are the distributional consequences of the 1989 tax change? When housing is taxed 
on an expenditure basis but other assets are taxed on an income basis, housing is taxed 
on an advantaged basis. Standard theory suggests this should lead to higher land prices 
and a boon for the first land owning generation. But the benefits accruing to the land-
owners of one generation do not come for free. They are offset by large costs that are 
imposed on all generations born after the tax change was introduced. They generate a 
higher net international debt position than would otherwise occur. And they are 
regressive, falling disproportionately on first home owners with low equity and renters.  
 
Since 1989, several investigations of New Zealand’s tax system have concluded that it 
favours owners of housing assets by not taxing imputed rent or the capital gains on 
owner-occupied housing. These investigations have typically concluded it is not 
politically possible to introduce these taxes. This may be the case – few countries have 
these taxes. But it should not be concluded that successive generations of New 
Zealanders have to suffer the distortionary effects of a tax system that is regressive, that 
places upward pressure on house prices, that encourages excessively large houses, and 
which imposes large costs on all cohorts than the first generation of land-owners. The 
root cause of the problem is taxing housing on an expenditure basis while other assets 
are taxed on an income basis. New Zealand could correct this distortion by taxing other 
assets on an expenditure basis, the solution adopted by most other countries. But if 
nothing is changed, and the distortion is not corrected one way or the other, New 
Zealanders will continue to have one of the most distortionary tax environments for 




New Zealand currently has one of the most distortionary tax environments for housing 
markets of any country in the OECD. This claim may sound odd to people used to 
hearing that New Zealand has some of the lowest and least distortionary labour market 
taxes in the OECD. Yet both claims can be true, and both claims have their roots in 
changes made to the tax system in the 1980s. One decision in particular contributed to 
both. In 1989, the government changed the way retirement income savings were taxed. 
 
To understand this argument, it is necessary to take one step backwards. Income can 
either be taxed when it is earned, or taxed when it is spent. The former taxes are called 
income taxes, while the latter taxes are called expenditure taxes. Each type of tax raises 
revenues, and each causes distortionary effects by altering the way people behave. It has 
long been understood that income taxes applied to capital income distort investment 
patterns more than expenditure taxes, partly because not all capital income is taxed at the 
same rate, which generates incentives to invest in lightly taxed assets. On the other hand, 
the revenue raised when capital incomes are subject to income tax can be used to reduce 
tax rates on labour income, reducing labour market distortions. This creates a quandary 
for governments. By taxing people when income is spent, the distortionary effects on 
capital markets are reduced, but taxes on labour incomes are high. In contrast, if people 
are taxed when income is earned, tax rates on labour incomes are low, but the allocation 
of capital is distorted unless all capital is taxed at the same rate.  
 
While most OECD countries use a hybrid system, since the 1970s there has been a shift 
towards expenditure taxes as their advantages have become clearer and implementation 
costs have fallen. Expenditure taxes can take several forms. Countries can apply indirect 
value-added taxes, which raise the price of goods and services. They may also apply 
various retail sales taxes. And, following the insights of Fisher (1937), countries can apply 
cashflow taxes that tax a person’s cashflow rather than their income. To do this, they 
adjust earnings for the net purchase and sale of assets, on the basis that this total is close 
to a person’s expenditure on consumption goods and services. For example, if someone 
earned $100,000 and saved $15,000, they would pay tax on $85,000. Alternately, if 
someone earned $100,000 and sold assets for $20,000, they would be taxed on $120,000.  
 
 6 
Most OECD countries default to an income tax basis but provide expenditure tax 
treatment to two classes of assets. The first class is earnings that are placed in a 
government-sanctioned retirement saving fund. In the vast majority of OECD countries, 
these are taxed on an expenditure basis by adopting an ‘Exempt-Exempt-Taxed’ (EET) 
rule.1 Income that is placed in a fund is not taxed when it is earned; interest and dividend 
earnings and any capital gains are not taxed when they accumulate in the fund; but when 
assets are withdrawn from the fund upon retirement, they are taxed. The second class is 
owner-occupied housing. In this case, a prepayment or ‘Taxed-Exempt-Exempt’ (TEE) 
expenditure tax rule is adopted: the house is purchased or paid off from income that is 
taxed when it is earned, but no tax is paid on the imputed rent produced by the property 
(the value of the rent that would be earned if the owner leased the property to someone 
other than themselves) or any capital gain that accrues to the owner. If tax rates on 
income are constant, the ‘Taxed-Exempt-Exempt’ and the ‘Exempt-Exempt-Taxed’ 
versions of expenditure taxes have the same effective tax treatment.2 The whole system is 
a hybrid because income from other investments is taxed on an income tax or ‘Taxed-
Taxed-Exempt’ (TTE) basis.3 Nonetheless, people who spend most of their income 
other than what they place within a sanctioned retirement income fund or put aside to 
purchase (or repay) owner-occupied housing effectively pay taxes on an expenditure 
basis.  
 
In the 1980s, New Zealand reformed its tax system in several ways. One of the reforms, 
the introduction of a Goods and Services tax, pushed the tax system towards an 
expenditure tax basis.4 A second reform pushed it towards an income tax basis. Until 
1989, New Zealand, like most other OECD countries, had an ‘Exempt-Exempt-Tax’ 
                                                 
1 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States all have a version of an EET retirement income saving scheme. Hungary 
has its equivalent, a TEE scheme. Denmark, Italy, and Sweden have ETT schemes. New Zealand and 
Australia are the obvious outliers, and Australia provides some ‘concessions’ to the taxation of retirement 
income saving by having low taxes on employee contributions and low taxes on interest and dividend 
income. See Whitehouse (1999) or Yoo and de Serres (2004).  
2 The “Taxed-Exempt-Exempt” and “Exempt-Exempt-Taxed” forms are not strictly equivalent, in part 
because realised capital gains are taxed under the latter rule but not the former, and different marginal tax 
rates may apply under the two forms. In expectation, they are sufficiently similar that it is widely 
considered that taxing one form of income under one rule and another form of income under the other 
should not distort investment choices. This issue is discussed at length by Kaldor (1955) and Batina and 
Ihori (2000).  
3 This means income is taxed when it is earned; any interest or dividends or profits are taxed when they 
accumulate, and capital gains may be taxed on a realized rather than an accrual basis; but there is no further 
tax when the investment is sold. 
4 The GST rate was further increased in 1989 and 2010 in response to the perceived advantages of 
expenditure taxes.  
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system for funds placed in sanctioned retirement income funds. This taxation treatment 
was abolished in 1989, and since then retirement income funds have been taxed on an 
income tax or TTE basis.5 Figure 1 depicts the change. Prior to 1989, owner-occupied 
housing and savings placed in sanctioned retirement funds were taxed on an expenditure 
basis, whereas other assets were taxed on an income basis. This meant there was a large 
tax wedge between the taxation of housing and retirement funds, on one hand, and other 
assets on the other. After 1989, the wedge between retirement assets and other assets was 
closed but a large wedge between retirement funds and owner-occupied housing was 
opened. Viewed in this light, the 1989 change can be considered New Zealand’s great 
income tax experiment. It is perhaps worth noting that no other country copied New 
Zealand’s move in the subsequent quarter century, and several former Eastern European 
countries consciously adopted expenditure tax systems for funds placed in specified 
retirement savings accounts. Moreover, one of the most in-depth tax reviews written 
since then, the 2010 Mirrlees Tax Review in the United Kingdom, recommended 
continuing the EET tax treatment of pensions, and suggested additional reforms should 
be adopted to tax other assets on an expenditure basis.6  
 
Why was the change undertaken in New Zealand? The 1987 Labour Government argued 
that the EET treatment of retirement savings provided a costly, regressive tax concession 
to the owners of capital. The 1988 Brash Committee, charged with investigating the 
proposal, agreed. The Committee portrayed the EET treatment of retirement savings as 
a distortionary tax concession that undermined the principle of tax neutrality, as it meant 
income placed in some saving vehicles (sanctioned retirement-income funds) were taxed 
much less that others (funds invested in businesses, or invested in other financial 
institutions such as banks, or used to purchase shares or businesses). The change was 
implemented providing a considerable short run increase in tax revenue.7 At the same 
time, proposals to tax capital gains were not implemented, providing an incentive to 
                                                 
5 In 2007, the New Zealand Government introduced a subsidised voluntary retirement income scheme 
called KiwiSaver. People placing funds in the accounts are provided with a $0.50 subsidy for each dollar 
placed into the account for the first $1,043 contributed per year. In principle, a subsidy on a voluntary 
retirement savings account could have reduced the tax distortions favouring housing. In practice, the 
nature of the subsidy means retirement savings are still taxed on an income basis. Income that is 
contributed to the retirement income account in excess of $1043 per year is still taxed at normal income 
tax rates, and the capital income earnings of the accounts are also taxed at normal income tax rates.  
6 Mirrlees and Adam (2010: chapter 14). This recommendation is consistent with the recommendations of 
the 1978 Meade Report (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Meade (1978)).  
7 From 1989 income tax was paid on all earnings when they were earned, including earnings placed in a 
retirement income account, and the earnings from these accounts. Under the previous regime, taxes were 
paid when earnings were withdrawn at retirement.  
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invest in long horizon assets with low pre-tax yields.8 Nor was imputed rent taxed, 
providing an incentive for people with housing equity to purchase more expensive 
houses than they would have if housing were taxed the same way as other assets.9 
Consequently, rather than eliminating the distortions in the tax system that came from 
taxing some assets on an income basis and other assets on an expenditure basis, the 1989 
reforms accentuated the different tax treatment of owner-occupied housing and other 
assets by imposing income taxes on a wider class of assets. This produced a tax 
environment for housing that can be considered quite distortionary relative to other 
OECD countries, for in most of these countries people can invest in non-housing assets 
on the same tax basis as they can invest in owner-occupied housing. 
 
The 1988 report by the Brash Committee did not discuss the taxation of residential 
housing, although it observed that it is important for the tax system to be neutral towards 
the income earned by different asset classes. However, the OECD, the 2001 McLeod 
Review and the 2010 Tax Working Group all expressed concern about the lack of 
neutrality of the tax system towards residential housing. The OECD recommended that 
imputed rent and capital gains should be taxed, with deductions allowed for mortgage 
interest, depreciation, and repairs and maintenance. The McLeod review preferred a 
different adjustment, the ‘Risk-Free Return Method’ in which tax should be levied on the 
product of an agent’s equity in a property and the risk free interest rate (McLeod 
Committee 2001, p iv) but perceived it would be difficult to implement and sustain such 
a reform. The Tax Working Group analysed capital gains taxes, land taxes and the risk-
free return method, but there were no recommendations to change the way owner-
occupied housing is taxed, and no changes were implemented.   
 
What are the effects of taxing housing differently from other assets? Standard analysis, 
supported by the OECD, the 2001 McLeod Review and the 2010 Tax Working Group 
suggests that taxing housing on an expenditure basis when other assets are taxed on an income 
tax basis will lead to larger houses and higher property prices. This creates a transfer to 
the first generation of owners at the expense of all future generations, who have to pay 
higher prices for housing. Consequently, for a quarter of a century, New Zealand’s tax 
                                                 
8 Proposals to enact comprehensive changes to the taxation of capital income were forwarded in the 1989 
document “Consultative Document on the Taxation of Income from Capital,” but were ignored. 
9 The proposition that imputed rent could be taxed was first raised by the 2001 McLeod Review. The idea 
has a long history and imputed rent is taxed in some European countries such as Switzerland and the 
Netherlands.   
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environment has imposed costs on current and future generations of young people 
because of the way it taxes housing and other assets.10  
 
This paper provides a review of the way New Zealand’s tax system alters the incentives 
to purchase property. Its purpose is to provide a wider perspective on the relationships 
between tax and housing markets than has previously been undertaken, particularly the 
impact on housing of the 1989 retirement saving tax reforms. In section 2, the effects of 
the tax system on the incentives of landlords to alter rent/price ratios and the incentives 
of owner-occupiers to construct different quality houses and bid up the price of different 
quality land are analysed. This section suggests the 1989 reform provided an incentive to 
construct larger houses as well as bid up the price of land which is conveniently located 
to desirable amenities. Section 3 documents two aspects of New Zealand’s property 
markets to see if they can be explained in terms of interest rates or taxes. The first is the 
rent/price ratio; the second is the size of new houses in New Zealand relative to new 
houses in the United States and Australia. It is shown that there was a large increase in 
the size of new houses in New Zealand relative to those in Australia and the United 
States after 1989, although it is not possible to be certain why this increase took place. In 
section 4 some of the welfare consequences of the tax system’s effects on housing 
markets are considered. While these depend on a variety of factors, particularly the rate 
of ongoing house price inflation, it is reasonably clear that the current tax system has 
regressive effects on younger people who wish to purchase their own homes. Moreover, 
standard theoretical models suggest the distortions stemming from the partial nature of 
the 1989 reforms have most likely imposed significant costs on all cohorts maturing after 
1989. These cohorts include people who are currently young, as well as all people 
intending to purchase property in New Zealand in the future. Conclusions are offered in 
section 5.  
 
2. Taxes and property markets: basic theoretical results.  
 
New Zealand has taxed capital incomes using an income tax framework since 1989. All 
capital incomes are subject to tax, with three main exceptions: the imputed rent 
                                                 
10 Several smaller modifications to the tax system were adopted after 2000, partly due to concerns about 
the distortionary effects of income taxes on investment choices. For instance, the top marginal tax rate was 
progressively reduced from 39% to 33%; the rate of GST was increased from 12.5% to 15% in 2010; and 
when KiwiSaver was introduced in 2007, the highest tax rate on investment earnings was capped at 28% to 
reduce the incentive to invest in more advantaged tax classes.  
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associated with the equity of an owner-occupier is not taxed; interest income earned by 
non-residents is taxed at only a very low rate; and capital gains are not taxed. Each of 
these exemptions creates incentives that distort the way that households and firms invest.  
 
Samuelson (1964) analysed how investment patterns are distorted when capital incomes 
are subject to income tax but capital gains are not taxed. One distortion occurs because 
income taxes create an incentive to invest in low-yielding long-horizon assets that have 
returns in different periods, because interest is compounded on an after-tax basis. A 
related distortion occurs because income taxes create an incentive to invest too much in 
indefinitely lived assets such as land. A third distortion occurs when there is inflation, 
because nominal interest returns rather than real interest returns are taxed. Each of these 
distortions is currently a feature of the New Zealand income tax system.  
 
Samuelson showed these distortions could be corrected by an accrual-based capital gains 
tax that allows for the deduction of depreciation and losses. If capital gains are taxed on 
an accrual basis, when a firm produces an income-producing asset, (i) capital gains tax is 
paid at time t on the value of the newly created asset, (ii) income tax is paid on the 
income stream produced by the asset, and (iii) capital gains tax is paid on any change in 
value of the asset in the year that this change takes place. This corrects the incentives to 
make low-yielding long-term investments because of their tax advantages. In turn, the 
present value of all assets will be independent of the tax rate, even if different agents 
have different tax rates, and equal to the value of the asset in the absence of taxes. A 
brief mathematical treatment of Samuelson’s results is provided in Appendix 1.  
 
Since Samuelson’s results are general, they apply to investments in residential property. 
Because residential property assets are long lived, income taxes without accrual-based 
capital gains taxes raise the after-tax returns relative to interest-earning debt and 
encourage over-investment in property. An accrual-based capital gains tax would correct 
this distortion for both owner-occupiers and landlords. But this is not the only distortion 
that affects New Zealand’s property markets, as the imputed rents accruing to owner-
occupiers are not taxed, providing additional incentives to invest in real estate.  
 
In the following subsections, three distortionary effects of New Zealand’s tax system on 
housing markets are considered. The first is the effect on the incentives of owner-
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occupiers to construct larger or better quality houses than otherwise. The second is the 
incentive for owner-occupiers to bid up the price of land that is conveniently located to 
desirable amenities. These are treated separately because supply of buildings is very 
elastic, whereas the supply of land is highly inelastic. The third concerns the effect on 
landlords to alter the rent/price ratio for leased property.11 Each of these distortions is 
considered independently from the others. To understand the overall effects of taxes on 
property prices, however, it is necessary to model these incentives simultaneously in a 
general equilibrium framework, along with other factors that affect the supply and 
demand for housing, such as the extent that agents are affected by borrowing constraints 
and the supply elasticities of new housing. Coleman (2010) provides an example of an 
equilibrium model of housing markets that simultaneously incorporates many features of 
New Zealand’s tax system and banking markets.  
 
2.1 The effect of income taxes on residential property owner-occupiers.  
When an owner-occupier purchases a property, neither the imputed-rent or the capital 
gains obtained from the property are subject to income tax. In these circumstances, 
income taxes distort choices about the size of houses people buy, and the price they will 
pay for conveniently located land. The analysis in this subsection calculates the tax 
distortions for households that own a property without a mortgage. About two-thirds of 
New Zealand houses are owned by owner-occupiers, about half of which are owned 
without a mortgage. The analysis also applies to owner-occupiers whose mortgage 
interest is tax deductible, for the opportunity cost of purchasing a larger house is the 
after-tax interest rate.12 The analysis partially applies to households that have a mortgage 
and who expect to be mortgage free at some point in their lives, as the opportunity costs 
of purchasing a house depend on future as well as current tax rates. The correct 
opportunity cost of purchasing a house for households that have a mortgage is the 
average of the pre-tax interest rate and the after-tax interest rate, where the weights are 
                                                 
11 It is possible that there is a fourth effect: that the tax rules affect the number of households and thus the 
quantity of houses that are demanded. For instance, young people may leave home at a different time in 
response to the tax rules, because of their effect on house prices and rents, or the divorce rate may change. 
Coleman (2010, 2014) models how the age at which children leave home may be affected by rents, and 
Coleman and Scobie (2009) provide a brief analysis of how the rate of household formation may have been 
affected by rents and house prices in New Zealand. They argue that housing demand is relatively price 
inelastic, which suggest the effect should be small. In any case, the effect of taxes on housing demand 
should be indirect: it should occur because of the effects of taxes on prices and rents.  Consequently, it can 
be considered as an additional response to any price changes that occur. 
12 Mortgage interest can be deducted against a taxpayer’s income if the loan is used to finance an asset that 
generates taxable income, such as a rental property or an investment in a public or private business. In this 
case the relevant interest rate is the mortgage rate, not the deposit rate. 
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the fractions of time the person expects to have a mortgage relative to the time they 
expect to be mortgage free. This weighted average is straightforward to calculate, but to 
enhance the clarity of the analysis in this subsection only the case where the opportunity 
cost is the after-tax interest rate is presented. It follows that the results of this section 
show the maximum tax-induced housing market distortions that apply to owner-
occupiers.13  
 
Residential property is also subject to rates – a property tax – levied by local authorities. 
The tax rate is typically under 0.5%, and while most authorities levy rates on the total 
value of a property, some only assess land values. A tax on land values in an open 
economy is largely non-distortionary, but a tax on housing structures provides an 
incentive to purchase a lower quality house. Property taxes are included in the following 
analysis even though they are not central to the story as they are imposed irrespective of 
the central government tax regime. The following analysis incorporates these local 
authority taxes, but focuses on the change in the total tax regime that occurs when there 
is a change in the taxes levied by central government.  
 
2.1.1 Taxes and the quality of houses (not land)  
When purchasing a house, the opportunity cost of purchasing a larger house is the after-
tax return to lending. Consider the option of buying a house (a structure) of quality θ that 
costs PH(θ) to build and returns an annual benefit H(θ) representing the real value of 
shelter. It is convenient to think of quality as the size of a house.  
 
Let  π  =  inflation rate, assumed to be the rate at which PH(θ) increases  
through time; 
i  =  nominal interest rate;  
 δ =  depreciation rate of houses; 
 τ  = marginal tax rate on income; 
 τH =  tax rate paid on imputed rent (currently zero);  
 τC = tax rate on capital gains (currently zero); and  
τL = local property tax on capital value. 
 
                                                 
13 The model Coleman (2010) uses to study the effect of capital gains taxes on housing markets uses an 
opportunity cost that is the average of current and future after-tax interest rates.  
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Let ( , , , , | , , )H H C L iω θ τ τ τ τ π δ be the after-tax value of purchasing a house relative to the 
after-tax value of lending. This is equal to the sum of the value of imputed rent plus the 
future value of the house adjusted for any capital gains taxes or property taxes and the 
opportunity cost of lending,  
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 The quality level that maximises ωH is found by calculating the first order condition of 
equation 1, and calculating the resultant marginal benefit to marginal price ratio: 
(1 ) (1 )( )( ) ( )
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− + − + −
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       (2) 
 
The marginal benefit/marginal price ratio denotes the annual marginal utility gain 
someone should obtain from spending an extra dollar on the quality of a house. If a 
house did not depreciate and there were no taxes, the ratio would equal the real interest 
rate. When all tax rates on capital income are zero, or when the tax system is neutral 
towards housing, either because taxes on imputed rent and on capital gains are equal to 
the tax on other income, or because housing and other capital income is subject to 
expenditure taxes, the ratio is equal to  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) LH
dH d i
dP d
θ θ δ δπ π τ
θ θ
= + + − +         (3) 
When neither imputed rent or capital gains are taxed, but interest income is taxed, the 
situation currently prevailing in New Zealand, the ratio is  
( ) ( ) (1 )
( ) ( ) LH
dH d i
dP d
θ θ τ δ δπ π τ
θ θ
= − + + − +        (4) 
 
Table 1 provides some sample values for the marginal utility/marginal house price ratio 
for the current tax system, for a neutral tax system, and for the tax systems that would 
occur if (i) capital gains were taxed but imputed rents were not taxed, and (ii) imputed 
rent were taxed but capital gains were not taxed. The values are calculated under the 
assumptions that the marginal tax rates are either 33% or 0%, and that the depreciation 
rate is 2.5%. Construction costs are assumed to increase at the rate of inflation. The table 
shows the average values for the decades of the 1990s, 2000s, and the five years to 
December 2015. 
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The table indicates that the tax system in place since 1990 reduces the benefits needed to 
justify an investment in better quality housing relative to other consumption by 
approximately 20 - 30% (Row 4). This reduction occurs because interest is taxed but the 
benefits of the larger house are not: a person deciding between spending $50,000 on a 
larger house or purchasing consumption goods and services each year with the interest 
from $50,000 will have an incentive to favour a larger house as the interest earnings are 
taxed. If housing is a usual type of good, households should increase the quality of the 
house until the marginal benefit of additional expenditure falls to the marginal benefit of 
other consumption. To a first approximation, one might expect the tax distortion to 
induce a 25% increase in the quality of the houses people choose. 
 
Rows 5 and 6 show the marginal utility/ marginal house price ratios that would occur if 
either capital gains taxes or a tax on imputed rent, but not both, were added to the 
current tax system. When the inflation rate is approximately the same as the depreciation 
rate, which has been the case in New Zealand since 1990, there is little change in the 
value of a housing structure (not the land) and a capital gains tax will have little effect on 
the demand for housing structures.  In these circumstances the main housing market 
distortion is the failure to tax imputed rent while interest income is taxed.  
 
How can the tax system be reformed so that it does not encourage over investment in 
housing structures? There are three basic ways. If the government wishes to pursue an 
income tax strategy, there should be equal taxes on interest, imputed rent, and capital 
gains. Alternately, it could adopt the ‘risk free return method’, in which owner-occupiers 
and landlords would have to pay tax on their equity in the property multiplied by the 
interest rate, for this method also generates the neutral outcome. Thirdly, it could pursue 
an expenditure tax approach, which, assuming neither imputed rent nor capital gains 
were taxed, would require interest income to be taxed on an expenditure basis. The latter 
method is the standard approach in most OECD countries, through the use of EET 
retirement income schemes. All of these reforms would correct the current tax incentive 
for households to live in higher quality houses than they would otherwise choose.14  
                                                 
14 If an expenditure tax approach were adopted, not all of the distortions in the tax system would 
be eliminated as capital income from sources other than housing or assets in retirement savings 
accounts would not be taxed on an expenditure basis. In contrast, if the income tax approach were 
implemented, all forms of capital income would be taxed on an equivalent basis.  This might 
suggest an income tax approach should be preferred. In practice, however, it has proved 
exceedingly difficult to tax housing income on a neutral income tax basis. This is one of the 
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If the income tax increases the incentive to build large houses, does it also increase the 
price of these houses? This question is difficult to answer precisely as the answer requires 
the simultaneous consideration of (i) heterogeneous housing quality, (ii) a housing 
demand function that depends on rents, current house prices, the expected rate of 
change of house prices in the future, and other factors such as the number of people in 
the local housing market, their income, interest rates and taxes, (iii) knowledge of how 
households form expectations about future house prices, (iv) a supply function for new 
construction that is inelastic and subject to capacity constraints, and (v) a rule that 
decides the order in which houses differing in terms of quality are built when the demand  
to build is unusually high. Although not specifically about housing, the classic approach 
was pioneered by Rosen (1974).  
 
Rosen’s approach calculates a long-run market equilibrium that depends on long-run 
supply and demand factors for goods that differ in terms of their quality, and then 
calculates transition paths to this equilibrium. He observed that the demand for one 
particular quality of housing depends on the prices for all quality types, as buyers make 
price/quality comparisons and buy the quality type that offers them best value. In the 
long run, prices must reflect production costs to ensure positive amounts of each quality 
level are supplied. The amount of housing of each quality type that is produced depends 
on the demand for each type of housing type when prices are equal to long-run 
production costs. Consequently, factors such as interest rates or taxes should have little 
effect on the price of houses in the long run, except to the extent that they directly raise 
construction costs.  
 
In the short and medium terms, however, the tax system may affect house prices as well 
as the quality of houses. A change in factors such as income, the local population, 
interest rates, or taxes can all induce an increase in housing demand. Some of these 
factors, such as an increase in population, will modestly increase demand across all 
quality levels, generating ordinary levels of new construction. Other factors, such as a 
decrease in interest rates or a change in the tax treatment of housing, can be expected to 
significantly increase most people’s demand for better quality housing all at once. When 
                                                                                                                                            
reasons most OECD countries have chosen to tax retirement savings on an expenditure tax basis 
to reduce the non-neutrality of the tax system.  
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this occurs there is a mismatch between the quality of the existing housing stock and the 
desired housing stock, and prices increase to match current demand with the available 
supply. 
 
The extent that prices need to increase depends on the extent that future prices are 
expected to reduce. When expectations are rational, and the supply imbalance is small, a 
small price increase may be sufficient to equate demand with the available supply, as 
expected future price declines will reduce contemporaneous demand. If expectations are 
not rational, or the demand imbalance is very large, large price increases may be 
necessary to reduce demand to match the available supply. When the total increase in 
demand is much greater than the available building capacity, as might occur in response 
to a large reduction in interest rates or an increase in tax rates, prices can remain higher 
than ordinary construction costs for some time, raising profit margins.15 For this reason, 
changes in interest rates and tax rates can induce lengthy but ultimately temporary 
increases in construction costs and the price of houses, even if construction costs are not 
affected by these factors in the long run. Consequently, while interest rates and taxes 
should ultimately only affect the average quality of housing, they can affect prices in the 
medium term if the induced changes in demand are large relative to construction 
capacity.  
 
2.1.2 Taxes and the value of land (not housing structures)  
A similar analysis can be applied to the circumstances where agents choose locations 
because of their convenience to desirable amenities. Let C(λ) be the ‘convenience yield’ 
obtained from living at location λ, and let PL(λ) be the price of land at this location. The 
convenience yield of a particular location depends on costs of going to a large range of 
different amenities: leisure activities, workplaces, the airport, local schools, shopping 
facilities and so on. If some of these amenities are rare and highly valued (e.g. a beach) 
and transport costs are high, the slope of the convenience yield with respect to location 
will be large and thus the price premium paid to live in these locations will be high. The 
convenience yield also increases with income and the size of the population when 
transport costs are high or transport times are slow, as income raises the value of being 
conveniently located and population increases congestion. Households should choose 
                                                 
15 In response to the increases in prices associated with the additional demand, the most profitable types of 
houses are built first: these are houses at quality levels where the gap between prices and construction costs 
is largest. 
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locations where the marginal cost of changing location generates an increase in the 
discounted value of the convenience yield equal to the value of goods and services that 
could have otherwise been purchased.  
 
Suppose the convenience yield increases through time at rate g, possibly because the 
population is increasing and there is a rising opportunity cost of congestion, or because 
incomes are growing and value of the time that is saved by living in a convenient location 
increases. Let ( , , , , | , , )L R C L i gω θ τ τ τ τ π be the after-tax value of purchasing property at 
location λ relative to the opportunity cost of lending:16  
( , , , , | , , ) (1 )( ( ) ( ))
( )(1 )(1 ) ( ( )(1 )(1 ) ( )) ( )(1 (1 ))
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The ratio of the marginal price of land to its marginal annual convenience yield is  
 (1 )( ) ( )
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     (6) 
This is the number of years of annual rent someone would be willing to pay for the 
additional convenience yield obtained from a property in a particular location. When 
there are no taxes, the ratio is  
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        (7) 
When interest income is taxed on an income tax basis, but neither imputed rent or capital 
gains are taxed (the New Zealand case), the ratio is  
( ) ( ) 1
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       (8) 
 
Tables 2a and 2b shows how the value of the marginal price/marginal convenience-yield 
ratio varies with the tax environment. Table 2a shows the ratios when real land prices are 
stable (g = 0%) but there is nominal price inflation; Table 2b shows the ratios when land 
prices increase in real terms at 1% per annum.  The ratios are calculated for the values of 
nominal interest rates and inflation rates that prevailed between 1990 and 2015. 
 
                                                 
16 Assume g+π < i(1-τ).  
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Consider first the case in which real property prices are stable. If the tax system were 
neutral, the marginal land-price/ annual convenience yield ratio would be the reciprocal 
of the real interest rate. Table 2a (row 1) indicates this ratio increased from 19 to 34 after 
1990 due to the decline in real interest rates, suggesting that real land prices in places 
where the marginal convenience yield is positive might have increased by 80% over the 
period. (The factors that create a high marginal convenience yield are discussed below.) 
New Zealand’s tax system has not been neutral toward housing since 1990, however; the 
interaction of the tax system with inflation mean that the marginal price/annual 
convenience yield ratios increased from 29 to 47 over the period (row 3). These ratios are 
at least 60% higher than they would be if New Zealand had a neutral tax system with 
local government property taxes, and 50% higher than they would be if New Zealand 
had a neutral tax system without property taxes. This increase in the ratios occurs 
because the nominal increases in house prices resulting from inflation are not taxed, 
whereas nominal interest earnings are taxed, creating an incentive for households to bid 
up the price of well located property.  
 
If real land prices consistently increase over time, even by 1% per year, the incentive to 
invest in residential property is even larger. Table 2b indicates that if there were neutral 
taxes (except for the property tax) and the long run annual land price growth was 1% per 
year, the decline in real interest rates since 1990 will have led to an increase in the 
price/convenience yield ratio from 21 to 41, somewhat more than when real property 
prices are stable. Under New Zealand’s tax system, however, the ratio will have increased 
from 41 in the 1990s to 92 after 2010.17 These ratios show the adoption of a non-neutral 
tax system significantly accentuated the incentives for households to bid up land prices as 
real interest rates declined.  
  
The extent that interest rates and taxes are capitalized into property values depends on 
the supply elasticity of land that is conveniently located to desirable amenities. The 
supply of conveniently located land will be large if transport costs are low or amenities 
are widespread, for then people will have many potential places to live that have high 
amenity value. These are circumstances that occur in some places such as the newer 
sunbelt cities in the United States, but which do not appear to describe New Zealand 
                                                 
17 In the 2000s the ratio increased to 136, a number that reflects the very low after tax real interest rates 
prevailing due to the high inflation rates experienced that decade. 
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locations such as Auckland. Conversely, distant suburbs may not be close substitutes if 
transport costs are high, roads are congested, natural amenities are unique and 
concentrated near the city’s centre, or they have few facilities. In the latter circumstances 
it seems likely that factors that increase the demand for housing will be strongly 
capitalized into land values with high convenience yield.  
 
How can the tax distortion be reduced? The solution is to adopt one of the three reforms 
that can be used to eliminate the distortions affecting the taxation of housing structures. 
If the government wants to have a neutral income tax system, it could have equal taxes 
on interest, imputed rent, and capital gains or it could adopt the ‘risk free return method’. 
If it wants to pursue an expenditure tax approach, interest income should be taxed on an 
expenditure basis.  
 
2.1.3 Combined land and house value  
Tables 1 and 2 indicate the percentage distortionary effect of New Zealand’s tax system 
on land prices is larger than its effect on the quality of housing structures. This is because 
land does not suffer the depreciation that reduces the rate at which the price of 
structures appreciates, and because the supply of conveniently located land is usually 
considerably less elastic than the supply of newly constructed buildings.  
 
The relative importance of the dollar value of tax distortions on structures and land 
prices depends of the relative importance of the price of a structure and the price of land. 
The dollar value effect of the tax distortion on land is much higher in Auckland than 
small cities like Dunedin as the marginal convenience yield from conveniently located 
land is higher than in these cities. However, the distortionary effects of the tax system on 
the quality of housing structures should be similar all around the country.  
 
Table 2b shows that the distortionary effects of the current tax system on land would 
only be partially reduced if either an accrual-based capital gains tax or a tax on imputed 
rent was introduced, but that a capital gains tax would have a larger effect than a tax on 
imputed rent. In contrast, Table 1 shows that a capital gains tax will do little to correct 
the effects of the current tax system on housing structures. This is unfortunate, because 
it means a single tax reform - either a tax on capital gains or a tax on imputed rent - is 
unlikely to simultaneously reduce the distortion on land prices and structures. 
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2.2 The effect of capital gains taxes on residential property investors.  
The distortions facing landlords are different than those facing owner-occupiers as rental 
income is taxed and mortgage interest payments are tax-deductible. This means the 
absence of a capital gains tax is the main distortion when capital income is taxed on an 
income tax basis. The following analysis assumes landlords enter the rental market until 
the after-tax return from rental housing is equal to the after-tax return from lending 
money. As the analysis examines the incentives on landlords, the focus is on the rent a 
landlord obtains net of costs such as depreciation and property taxes.18  
 
Let  PR  =  taxable rent income net of costs such as property taxes; 
 πh  =  expected real rate of increase of property prices; and 
 P =  price of properties.  
 
In the absence of tax, equating the annual return from an investment of size P in 
residential housing (rent plus house price appreciation) with the annual return from 
lending the sum P  means  
 








π π⇒ = + −
P          (10) 
 
With the current income tax system, equating the annual after-tax returns from an 
investment in residential housing and lending P  means  
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Consequently, the income tax reduces the rent/price ratio by an amount that is an 
increasing function of the inflation rate and the rate of real house price appreciation.  
 
                                                 
18 Landlords can deduct interest payments, property taxes, insurance costs, depreciation on furnishings, the 
cost of repairs and maintenance, and any fees paid to property managers. Prior to 2011, depreciation on 
buildings could also be claimed. Losses made from leased property are deductible against other income and 
are not ring-fenced.   
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This distortion is entirely corrected by an accrual-based capital gains tax on nominal 
house price increases. While this correction is non-distortionary, when there is inflation it 
would mean capital income from rental housing is taxed at much higher real rates than 
the statutory rate, just as real interest earnings are currently taxed at higher rates than the 
statutory rate when the inflation rate is positive. This distortion could be eliminated by 
only taxing real capital gains and by only taxing real interest rates, for in this case   
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    (13) 
Table 3 shows the effect of the tax distortion evaluated at the interest and inflation rates 
prevailing from 1990 to 2015, under the assumption that the ongoing real house price 
appreciation rates are 0 or 1%.  The decline in real interest rates over the period reduced 
the rent/price ratio by approximately half, from 5.3% to 2.9%, if zero real house price 
appreciation was expected, or from 4.2% to 1.9% if 1% annual real house price 
appreciation was expected (row 1). The tax distortion is shown in rows 2 and 3 of the 
table. When the rate of real property price appreciation is 1% a year and real interest 
rates are small relative to the inflation rate, this distortion reduces the rent/price ratio by 
at least a third and often by much more. In the five years to 2015, for instance, the tax 
distortion means rent/price ratios would only be 47% of what they would be if the tax 
system were neutral. 
 
The arbitrage conditions facing landlords only determine the ratio of rents to house 
prices. The decline in the ratios could have taken place as a decline in rents, a rise in 
house prices, or a combination of both. The extent that house prices rise rather than 
rents fall depends on the overall structure of the economy, including factors such as the 
elasticity of supply of housing and the elasticity of demand for rental housing with 
respect to rents. If the supply of housing is very elastic, the decrease in the rent/price 
ratio will take place through a decline in rents, rather than an increase in prices. 
Conversely, if the supply of housing is inelastic, the decrease in the rent/price ratio will 
take place through an increase in house prices. Figure 3  (discussed in section 3.2) shows 
the evolution of real house prices and real rents in the economy since 1975. The data 
show rents have been rather stable, whereas house prices have increased sharply, 
particularly since 2000. This suggests the decrease in the rent/price ratio has been 
dominated by the rise in house prices. 
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What is the role of the changing tax treatment of retirement savings in this analysis? 
Even though there was no capital gains tax prior to 1989, rental property was not tax 
advantaged because it was taxed on an income-tax basis while investments in sanctioned 
retirement saving funds were taxed on an expenditure-tax basis.19 Since 1989, the absence 
of a capital gains tax means they are taxed more advantageously than investments in debt 
instruments, even though investments in rental property are taxed on the same basis as 
other equity investments.20 Consequently, the effects of the 1989 tax changes on rental 
property markets may be greater than the change from neutral to tax-advantaged status 
indicated in Table 3, as the 1989 starting position was not neutral but biased against 
rental property. In light of the relative change in the tax system, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the number of private landlords in New Zealand increased from 62,000 in 
1991 to 276,000 in 2014.  
 
2.3 Tax rules and home ownership rates 
Given that the tax rules provide incentives for both owner-occupiers and landlords to 
purchase property, is it possible to describe definitively the effect on owner-occupancy 
rates? In short, the answer is ‘No’. There are now several theoretical papers that have 
tried to analyse how owner-occupancy rates are affected by the tax system in settings in 
which property prices are endogenously determined, using general equilibrium models 
that incorporate agents who differ in terms of income, wealth, age, and in the amount 
that they can borrow. For example, Coleman (2008, 2010, 2014) analyses the possible 
effects of different tax rules on owner-occupancy rates in New Zealand, while Chambers, 
Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009) and Li and Yao (2007) provide an analysis for U.S. 
conditions.21  The key insight of this literature is that when the tax system provides 
incentives for both owner-occupiers and landlords to bid up house prices, the agents 
with the tightest credit constraints are the least likely to purchase houses. In most cases, 
young low-income households face tighter credit constraints than older, wealthier 
                                                 
19 A referee usefully pointed out that the tax system may have been less-than-neutral towards investment 
property in 1989 - that is, biased against property investment - as losses were technically ring-fenced. 
Consequently the post-1989 changes led to an even larger improvement in the tax position of some 
landlords (those who borrowed sufficiently large quantities that they made losses) than indicated here.  
20 Prior to 1989, an investment in a rental property was tax disadvantaged relative to an investment in debt 
instruments that were held in a sanctioned retirement income fund, but they were tax-advantaged relative 
to an investment in debt instruments held outside a retirement income fund as these investments were 
taxed on an income tax basis. The difference occurs because income taxes raise the effective tax rate on 
nominal interest income when there is inflation, but expenditure taxes do not.   
21 Also see Jeske (2005) for an overview of the generic issues.   
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landlords, so they are forced to delay their purchase of property and owner-occupancy 
rates fall. The results depend on the tax rules and the extent that credit constraints affect 
different classes of people, but it is entirely plausible that New Zealand’s current tax rules 
reduce home-ownership rates. Coleman (2008, 2014) argues this is the case, and suggests 
that the decline in owner-occupancy rates that took place in New Zealand after 1989 may 
be partly attributable to the tax rules, although may also reflect the declines in interest 
rates that occurred after that date.   
 
3. House sizes and property prices in New Zealand. 
 
If real interest rates are an important determinant of property prices, rents and housing 
quality in New Zealand, low interest rates should lead to low rent/house-price ratios, 
high prices for land conveniently located to valuable amenities, and a demand for large or 
high quality houses. In principle, the change in the tax system that occurred in 1989 
should act as a natural experiment similar to a decline in real interest rates and lead to 
distinct before-and-after effects. In practice, the effects of the tax change are not easy to 
unpick. New Zealand experienced a raft of reforms and macroeconomic shocks in the 
1980s and early 1990s, many of which should have significantly affected property 
markets. First, there was a substantial decrease in the inflation rate and nominal interest 
rates after the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act was adopted in 1989. Real rates 
subsequently fell, in line with the declines in real interest rates around the rest of the 
world. Secondly, inward migration surged after 1990, following a reform of migration 
policy. Thirdly, New Zealand experienced a financial crisis between 1987 and 1992, 
beginning with the 1987 sharemarket crash. This crisis ultimately caused New Zealand’s 
deepest post-war recession and made many people wary of investments in listed equities. 
Fourthly, there was a sustained increase in incomes after the crisis ended in 1993. All of 
these events mean it is foolish to attribute changes in real estate markets to any single 
macroeconomic cause.22  
 
                                                 
22 A referee suggested it might be possible to analyse whether the effects of various changes in the tax 
system that were implemented after 1989 might be discerned in property markets. For instance, the GST 
rate was increased from 12.5% to 15% in 2010, and the top marginal tax rate was gradually reduced from 
39% to 33%. The introduction of the PIE regime also limited tax payments on certain investments, and 
there have been changes to the type of expenses that can be charged against income by landlords. In 
principle, these suggestions could be pursued although they have not been examined in this paper. In 
practice, these changes are much smaller than the change undertaken in 1989 and the low power of tests 
used to analyse time-series data of this nature make it unlikely that statistically significant results (either 
way) could be obtained.  
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The reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s are considered to have profoundly 
changed the New Zealand economy. Since then there has been a significant increase in 
population, nominal GDP, and wealth. Table 4 provides some basic information about 
wealth in 1998 (the first year for which comprehensive information about wealth is 
available from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand), 2007, and 2015.  The table indicates 
the value of housing and land wealth relative to GDP increased from 2 to 3.5 over the 
period. In contrast, the value of other assets (total wealth minus the value of housing and 
land) relative to GDP remained relatively stable. As a result, the value of housing and 
land as a fraction of net wealth increased significantly, from 63 percent to 78 percent. 
(The wealth held in Superannuation and Insurance funds fell from 38% of GDP in 1998 
to 22% in 2007, before recovering to 30% in 2015 as a result of large inflows into the 
new KiwiSaver accounts.)  
 
The remainder of this section provides basic information about the behaviour of 
property prices, rents, and the size of new houses in New Zealand, as well as providing a 
brief comparison with house price movements in other OECD countries. As the data 
make clear, property prices increased substantially more quickly after 1990 than prior to 
1990, although the most rapid increases occurred after 2000, a decade after the tax 
change. Indeed, between 1990 and 2016 New Zealand had the largest real increase in 
house prices of any of the 23 OECD countries for which data are available from the 
International House Price Database. In addition, the size of new houses increased 
rapidly, with the most noticeable increases taking place after 1989. This evidence is 
broadly consistent with the hypothesis that the 1989 tax changes should have lead to 
increases in house prices, reductions in rent/price ratios, and increases in house sizes. 
However, since it is not possible to control for all the other changes taking place in the 
New Zealand economy, it cannot be claimed that the data confirm the hypothesis.  
 
3.1 Trends in house prices and rents 
 
Figure 2 shows the pattern of real house prices from 1923 to 2014. For the period 1962 
to 2014 the data are a quality-adjusted property price index deflated by the consumer 
price index.23 For the period 1923 to 1962 the data are the average selling price of houses 
                                                 
23 The data refer to the price of detached houses and are based on Quotable Value data compiled by the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand. http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/key-graphs/key-graph-house-price-
values 
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deflated by the consumer price index.24 As the latter data are simple averages and are not 
adjusted for changes in the underlying quality of the properties, they are not directly 
comparable with the data from 1962 to 2014. The dominant feature of the figure is the 
sharp increase in real prices after 2000, which took place in conjunction with similar 
increases in several other OECD countries. The growth rates of prices in different sub 
periods are presented in Table 5. 
 
From 1923 to 1962, the average selling price of houses increased by 3.3 % per year, of 
which 2.2% can be attributed to generalized inflation and 1.5% represents a real increase 
in the average selling price.25 It is likely that a large fraction – perhaps 80 percent – of the 
real increase in the average selling price is due to changes in the quality of properties, 
reflecting larger houses and the rising share of properties sold in Auckland.26 The 
underlying rate of real price appreciation was probably less than 0.5% per year. 
 
From 1962 to 2014, nominal property prices increased by 8.5% per annum, of which 
6.0% was the result of generalized inflation, and 2.4% represents real price appreciation. 
Property prices changed quite differently before and after 1990. From 1962 to 1990, 
prices increased by 11.1% per year, of which 9.7% was the result of inflation and 1.3% 
represents a real increase, but from 1990 to 2014 prices increased by 5.7% per year, of 
which 2.1% was due to inflation and 3.5% represents a real increase. Most of the real 
price increase took place after 2000: real house price increased by 2.5% per year from 
1990 to 2000, whereas they increased by 4.2% per year from 2000 to 2014.  
 
Data on rents are available from Statistics New Zealand for the period 1975-2014.27 
Figure 3 shows the behaviour of real rents and real house prices over this period. From 
1975 to 1990, rents increased at 0.9% per year, while house prices fell by 0.8% per year, 
with most of the decline happening in the late 1970s. This means rent/price ratios 
increased significantly, peaking in 1991. From 1990 to 2000 rents increased at a slightly 
                                                 
24 The average sales price is calculated as the total value of urban properties transferred under the Land 
Transfer Act divided by the number of properties transferred. The original data were compiled monthly 
and recorded either in the New Zealand Official Year Book or the (Monthly) Abstract of Statistics.  
25 Most of the real price increase occurred in 1950 following the removal of price regulations. A similar 
increase occurred in Australia in 1950, for the same reason. 
26 When trends in the average selling price are compared with trends in the average quality-adjusted price 
index over the period for which both series are available, 1962 to 1985, the average selling price increased 
by 1.2 percent per year faster than the quality adjusted index, but otherwise they exhibit very similar trends.  
27 From 1975 to 1999, the series are CPY.SE9C1, rented dwellings, from the consumer price index. From 
1999 onwards the series is CPI013AA.  
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lower rate than house prices. Thereafter there is a decided break in the pattern, as real 
rents broadly stayed the same but real house prices sharply increased.28 It is clear, 
therefore, that since 2000 changes in the rent/house-price ratio have been dominated by 
changes in house prices, not rents. 
 
3.2 International House Price Movements  
New Zealand has not been alone in experiencing house price increases since 1990. Table 
6 shows real house price changes for 23 OECD countries, using data from the 
International House Price Database provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 
based upon methodology described in Mack and Martínez-García (2011). The countries 
include all members of the G-10 (the largest members of the OECD) as well as several 
smaller countries including Australia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Israel and Norway. The 
data show the increase in real house prices between 1975 (when the series begin) and 
1990; the increase between 1990 and 1997 (when New Zealand went into a shallow 
recession associated with the Asian crisis) and between 1990 and 2000; and the increase 
between 1990 and the end of 2016.  
 
The data indicate that many countries experienced large house price increases between 
1990 and 2016, with real house prices increasing by more than 100 percent in eleven of 
the twenty-three countries, and by more than 50 percent in a further three.29 Over the 
full period, New Zealand experienced the largest price increase, 25 percent higher than 
the next highest country. Most of this increase occurred after 2000, particularly after 
2010. But New Zealand also had the fifth largest increases between 1990 and 2000, and 
the third largest between 1990 and 1997 before the downturn associated with the Asian 
Crisis took place. In contrast, New Zealand had the third lowest increase between 1975 
                                                 
28 The decrease in rents that occurred after 2000 largely reflects a decline in public, not private rents.  
29 It is widely believed these increases reflect the steep decline in interest rates that occurred after 1990, 
although prices did not increase everywhere, falling in Italy, South Korea and Japan. 
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and 1990, possibly because real house prices peaked in 1975, following a large 
immigration influx, before falling between 1977 and 1980 in response to high emigration.  
 
Of course, these data do not show that the reason for New Zealand’s large increase in 
house prices since 1990 is the 1989 tax change. There are many possible explanations for 
the house price increase, of which tax changes are but one. They do indicate, however, 
that the price increase has been large and persistent by international standards. 
 
 
3.2 Interest rates, rents, and house prices.  
An implication of the analysis in section 2 is that when rent/price ratios are set relative to 
the returns available from interest earning debt, they should reflect the difference 
between real interest rates and the expected rate of house price inflation, adjusted for a 
term that reflects the tax on the inflation component of interest rates:  
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If real interest rates are unrelated to the expected inflation rate or the expected real rate 
of house price increase, a matter discussed below, the rent/price ratio should be a linear 
function of the real interest rate, falling when real interest rates fall and rising when real 
interest rates rise. Figure 4 shows a ‘linked scatter plot’ of the relationship between real 
mortgage rates and the rent/price ratio from 1975 to 2014.30 The figures dispel the 
hypothesis that there was a well-defined positive correlation between real interest rates 
and the rent/price ratio over the whole period. Rather, the rent/price ratio was broadly 
constant between 1975 and 2000, even though real interest rates varied between –6% and 
12%. After 2000, the rent/price ratio dropped sharply, in a manner little related to real 
interest rate movements. It is worth noting that the timing of the decrease in the 
                                                 
30 The house price and rent series are described in footnotes24 and 27. Nominal mortgage interest rate data 
are sourced from the Reserve Bank table hb2. From 1975 to June 1998, the floating mortgage rate is used. 
From September 1998, the mean of the floating rate and the 2 year rate are used. The nominal interest rate 
is converted into a real interest rate by deflating the inflation rate. At time t, the inflation rate is the annual 
average change in the CPI from t-4 to t+4 i.e. an average of the backward looking and forward looking 
inflation rate. For 2014, it is assumed the forward  inflation rate is 1% pa.   
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rent/price ratio coincides with an increase in the top marginal tax rate from 33% to 39%, 
an increase that widened the after-tax wedge between the returns available from property  
and interest earning debt.31  A very similar picture is obtained when the real deposit rate 
is used instead of the real mortgage rate. The lack of a relationship between the 
rent/price ratio and real (or nominal) interest rates is confirmed by regression analysis. 
Simple regression analysis shows that the rent/price ratio and the real interest rate both 
appear to be described by unit root processes, but the two variables are not cointegrated, 
either over the full period or the period since 1990. As such, any linear relationship 
between the series is spurious. (See Appendix 2 for the details of these results.32)  
 
These data raise considerable doubts about the extent that trends in house prices and 
rents since 1975 can be explained by real mortgage rates. There are at least three possible 
ways to rehabilitate the theory. The first is to observe that a linear regression between the 
rent/price ratio and the real interest rate will be misspecified if variables which affect the 
rent/price ratio and which are correlated with the real interest rate series are omitted 
from the regression. The two obvious variables are the expected rate of real house price 
inflation, and the expected inflation rate (see equation 12). Unfortunately, series 
measuring the expected rate of real house price appreciation or the expected rate of 
inflation amongst landlords are not available. It is of course possible to use proxies. 
Landlords may have lagged expectations, for example, and expect the future rate of real 
house price increases  (and the expected rate of general inflation) to be equal to past 
rates: perhaps the rate over the previous year or the average rate over the preceding three 
years. These proxies can be used in a regression, but these are unlikely to be accurate 
unless it known for sure that expectations are determined in this manner. For example, if 
3h
tπ = the average real house price appreciation rate over the preceding three years, and 
3
tπ = the average inflation rate over the preceding three years, it is not possible to reject 
the hypothesis that the residuals et of the following equation  
3 3
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31 The tax rate was increased to 39% in 2000 and progressively reduced back to 33% beginning in 2010.  
32 For the period 1975 to 2014 the sample correlation coefficient between real interest rates and the real 
house price index is 0.10, while for the sub-period 1990 to 2014 the correlation coefficient is 0.64 .The 
sample correlation coefficients are deeply misleading as a linear regression between the rent/price ratio and 
the real interest rate is spurious.  For either the full period or the sub-period it is not possible to reject the 
hypothesis that the rent/price ratio and the real mortgage rate have unit roots; but it is possible to reject 
the hypothesis that the two series are cointegrated. These regressions are reported in Appendix 2. 
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have a unit root and thus that there is no long-run linear relationship between the 
variables.33 34(See Appendix 2 for details.)  
 
The failure to find a relationship between the rent/price ratio and real interest rates when 
these and similar proxies for expectations are included in the regression suggests one of 
two alternatives. First, it could be that expectations of future real house price changes 
cannot be described by lagged expectations. A better measure of expectations is needed 
to explain the evolution of rent/price ratios in the last 40 years. Secondly, the relative size 
of the after-tax returns from rental housing and interest earning debt may not be an 
important determinant of rent/price ratios. Some other factor is important, particularly 
since 2000. It is possible, for example, that the increase in the top marginal tax rate to 
39% between 2000 and 2010 may have changed attitudes towards property ownership 
and investment and sparked a revaluation of house prices, although this theory cannot 
adequately explain why property prices remained high after taxes were reduced in 2010. 
  
The second explanation for why a linear relationship between rent/price ratios and real 
interest rates has not existed since 1975 is based on the observation that New Zealand 
had tightly controlled credit markets prior to 1985. It is plausible that any relationship 
between real interest rates and the rent/house-price ratio would hold only after 1990, 
once credit markets had been deregulated and inflation had been reduced to low levels. 
However, as indicated above, it cannot be established that there was a linear relationship 
between the two variables in the period since 1990 either. There was relatively little 
variation in rent/price ratios between 1990 and 2000 despite considerable falls in real 
interest rates; there was a steep decline in rent/price ratios between 2000 and 2010 
despite relatively little variation in real interest rates; and there was little variation in 
rent/price ratios from 2010 to 2014 despite variation in real interest rates.  
 
A third explanation for the weak relationship between real interest rates and rent/price 
ratios is based on the argument that nominal rather than real interest rates are the key 
determinant of property prices because when people are credit constrained they are 
                                                 
33 The hypothesis cannot be rejected for either the whole period 1975 to 2014 or the sub-period 1990 to 
2014. 
34 The failure to show there is a long-run relationship between the rent/price ratio and either the real 
interest rate or the lagged change in property prices does not mean that there is not a short run 
relationship. Since changes in real house prices are serially correlated, such a relationship does exist: price 
increases or price decreases tend to occur in runs. This issue is also discussed in Appendix 2.  
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affected by nominal rather than real interest to income repayment ratios.35 The sample 
correlation coefficients between nominal interest rates and real house prices are 0.10 for 
the whole period and 0.57 for the period 1990 to 2014, but once again these correlation 
coefficients are misleading as the regressions are spurious.  
 
What can be concluded? Real interest rates clearly affect the relative returns from 
investing in rental properties and interest earning debt. However, these relative returns 
are not systematically related to rent/price ratios in any simple manner. Some other 
factor is needed to explain the pattern of rent/price ratios since 1990. 
 
 
3.3 The size of new residential housing construction.  
Internationally, there is almost no systematic analysis of the size of new residential 
construction. Figure 5 traces the size of newly constructed residential houses in Australia, 
New Zealand, and the United States, the three countries for which data are available.36 
(New houses in all three countries are now considerably larger than houses in European 
countries.37) These data show the average size of newly constructed houses increased  
steadily between 1980 and 2010 in all three countries, and that new houses in the U.S. 
and Australia have been consistently larger than new houses in New Zealand.  
 
Figure 6 shows the same data, but with each country’s house size normalised to equal 
100 in 1989. The figure shows that the size of newly constructed housing was stable in 
New Zealand from 1980 to 1989, at which point it increased sharply. (Between 1974 and 
1979 newly constructed houses were very small, reflecting various regulations that 
artificially reduced the average size of new buildings.38) The rate of increase in New 
Zealand after 1989 is much higher than in either Australia or the United States.  
                                                 
35 This argument was made in the 1970s by Modigliani (1976) and Kearl (1979) among others.. 
36 New Zealand data are from Statistics New Zealand, “Number, value and floor area by building type, 
nature and region” BLD075AA. Australian data are from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Building 
Approvals” February 2010 8731.0 (The series is no longer produced.) U.S data from 1999 are from 
http://www.census.gov/construction/chars/completed.html  spreadsheet " SFForSaleMedAvgSqFt". 
Earlier data are from http://www.census.gov/construction/chars/historical_data/ . This site has a series 
of books with the data e.g. US Department of Commerce (2000) "Characteristics of New Housing 1999".  
37 International data are not regularly compiled. The BBC reported some statistics in 2009. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8201900.stm Similar data are available from 
Demographia  http://www.demographia.com/db-intlhouse.htm. Both sources suggest average house sizes 
in European countries range from 76m2 in the United Kingdom to 137m2 in Denmark.  
38 There were two different regulations.  Due to the large scale immigration that took place between 1973 
and 1975, people applying for a building permit in excess of 1500 square feet (125 m2) were automatically 
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The relationship between the average quality of newly constructed houses and incomes, 
interest rates and tax rates is conceptually complex. As incomes increase, there will be an 
increased demand for better quality houses and a reduced demand for lesser quality 
houses. This means there will be a mismatch between the distribution of two stock 
variables: the desired quality distribution and the existing quality distribution. It can be 
expected that new construction and alterations will take place to reduce the mismatch at 
each quality level. However, there is no obvious reason why there would be a constant 
relationship between the amount of new construction at different quality levels and 
explanatory factors such as income, as the relationship will depend on the initial stock as 
well as the desired stock. Nor is it clear which quality level will be most profitable to 
build first if there are large changes in explanatory variables. All this means that the 
average size of new houses should be positively related to per capita incomes and 
inversely related to real interest rates, but there is no reason why the relationship should 
be linear.  
 
Figure 7 shows a scatter-plot tracing the relationship between real mortgage rates and the 
average floor size of new dwellings between 1975 and 2014.39 For the post 1991 period, 
it appears that there is a negative correlation between real mortgage rates and the average 
size of building permits size, but from 1975 to 2014 the relationship appears rather 
weaker. These data suggest that any attempt to find a consistent relationship between 
house sizes and real interest rates using all of the data from 1975 to 2014 will not be 
successful, although there is an apparent negative correlation after 1989.  
 
Can the increase in the average size of newly constructed housing beginning in 1989 be 
explained by the subsequent changes in income and interest rates? In a Scottish court, 
the answer would probably be “Not Proven.” Using data from 1989 onwards, there is 
clearly a positive correlation between the average size of new construction and per capita 
                                                                                                                                            
delayed by 18 months. This regulation was rescinded following the mass emigration to Australia beginning 
1976. Secondly, the government offered concessional loans to young first home buyers so long as they 
built or purchased a new home. This raised the demand for new houses by young, credit constrained 
households; these houses tend to be small. The requirement that people could only use concessional loans 
to purchase new homes was rescinded on March 15 1979.  
39Nominal mortgage interest rate data are sourced from the Reserve Bank table hb3. From September 
1998, the preferred series is the mean of the floating rate and the 2 year rate. From 1975 to June 1998, the 
fixed rate series is not available and the floating mortgage rate is used instead. The nominal interest rate is 
converted into a real interest rate by deflating the inflation rate. At time t, the inflation rate is the annual 
average change in the CPI from t-4 to t+4 i.e. an average of the backward looking and forward looking 
inflation rate. For 2014, it is assumed the forward  inflation rate is 1% pa.  
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incomes, and a negative correlation with real interest rates. The problem is that interest 
rates have a downwards trend for the whole period, while building size and per capita 
incomes have an upward trend. Once the trends are accounted for, it is not possible to 
be sure that the relationships are not spurious.  Formally, when each of the three series 
have a unit root, testing whether the average size of new construction is a linear function 
of incomes and real interest rates is equivalent to testing whether the three series are 
cointegrated. Using data from 1989 to 2014 it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that 
the series are not cointegrated. (The results are presented in appendix 2.) Consequently, it 
is not possible to conclude statistically that the increase in the average size of new 
construction since 1989 is due to the decrease in interest rates and the increase in 
incomes taking place since then. Some additional explanation is needed.  
 
3.4 Summary 
What can be concluded from post 1989 housing market data? Relative to pre-1989 
trends, there has been a substantially faster increase in property prices, a substantial 
decline in rent/price ratios, and a large increase in the average size of new houses. These 
changes are all consistent with the change in the incentives that followed the great 
income tax experiment of 1989. Most of them are also consistent with the decline in real 
interest rates, the reduction in inflation, and the increase in per capita incomes that have 
taken place since then. Unfortunately, the statistical relationships between the rent/price 
ratio and real interest rates, and between the average size of newly constructed houses 
and real interest rates and incomes are too imprecisely estimated to know how much 
these factors explain the changes in the housing market. For this reason, it is not possible 
to estimate the residual role of the tax changes either, at least using aggregate data. This 
means the data neither prove nor disprove the contention that the changes in incentives 
that followed the changes to the tax system were actually responsible for the subsequent 
change in the housing market.  
 
4. Taxes and Housing Markets: Distributional Effects.  
Non-neutral taxes on property have two types of distributional consequences. First, taxes 
redistribute income between members of a cohort, for if tax revenues are not obtained 
by taxing the capital income produced by housing they must be obtained by taxing 
someone or something else. Secondly, non-neutral taxes redistribute income between 
cohorts, because property prices – particularly the land component of property prices – 
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change. When housing is tax advantaged, land prices increase and the first generation of 
land owners receives a transfer at the expense of all subsequent generations.  
 
The theoretical literature examining the intergenerational consequences of non-neutral 
taxes on property income began with Feldstein (1977). He showed that in most 
circumstances a tax on land rent in a closed economy will not only reduce the price of 
land but will lead to a long run increase in the capital stock. This is because young agents 
will have to spend less of their savings buying land, enabling them to invest more in 
businesses and assets.40 Conversely, if land incomes are under-taxed relative to capital 
incomes, land prices will rise and long term capital accumulation will decrease.41 Chamley 
and Wright (1987) analysed the dynamic properties of Feldstein’s closed economy model, 
also finding that taxes on property income usually resulted in an increase in capital 
investment and a decline in land prices.42 Eaton (1988) extended this analysis by 
examining the effect of property income taxes in a small open economy. He showed land 
prices would unambiguously fall, since interest rates were determined in international 
markets, and the long run net asset position of the country would improve as additional 
local savings replaced foreign savings.  
 
In each of these cases, an intergenerational transfer takes place at the time the tax change 
is introduced. If taxes on property income are increased, the first generation of land 
owners is worse off as the price of land declines.  The welfare consequences for 
subsequent generations depend on what happens to the tax revenues that are raised. If 
they are refunded to contemporaneous generations, all of these generations will be 
unambiguously better off as they pay the same total amount in taxes but have to pay less 
for land. These generations will also be better off if the government uses the tax revenue 
to purchase valued goods and services. In both of these circumstances, standard 
economic theory indicates the discounted value of the gains by subsequent generations is 
equal to the losses of the first generation. These conditions need not hold if the tax 
revenue is wasted. Moreover, as Fane (1984) showed, if the government issued bonds to 
                                                 
40 The increase in capital should increase the marginal product of land, raising the pre-tax return from land. 
In some circumstances, the reduction in interest rates stemming from the greater capital levels can lead to a 
long run increase in the price of land, as total production in the economy increases.  
41 Calvo, Kotlikoff and Rodriguez (1979) show that the latter result will be not hold if each generation of 
landowners bequeath to the subsequent generation a sum equal to the increase in land prices that stems 
from the concession tax treatment of land.  
42 However, they also showed that land prices could increase if interest rates fell sufficiently low, but that 
the total value of any increase in land prices would be less than half of the tax revenue raised. 
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compensate the first generation for their land price loss, there would be no gain to 
subsequent generations if the subsequent tax revenues were used to pay interest on the 
bonds.  
 
In contrast, if taxes on property income decrease, the first generation of land owners 
would be better off as their land prices would increase. All subsequent generations would 
be worse off as they would have to pay higher prices for land while still paying the same 
total amount in taxes. Skinner (1996) specifically analysed the case of capital income 
from residential property. He showed that when other forms of capital income were 
taxed more heavily than housing, the price of housing increases, which, (in the absence 
of altruistic bequests) leads to higher consumption by the first generation and lower 
capital accumulation and consumption by all other generations. He argued that this 
intergenerational shift is the most important consequence of taxing housing and other 
forms of capital asymmetrically. Gervais (2002) examined how the tax code affects the 
housing market and capital accumulation when property prices do not change. He argued 
that favourable tax treatment – particularly the non-taxation of imputed rent – generates 
an incentive to purchase better quality houses, leading to higher residential investment 
but lower business investment. He argued that the elimination of the housing tax 
concessions would raise welfare in the long run. More generally, Batina and Ihori (2000) 
analysed how the incidence of various combinations of income and consumption taxes 
affects land prices and residential property stocks, finding generally similar results, 
although they also showed that the incidence of the tax depend on details of the tax 
system such as whether or not housing maintenance expenses are subject to 
consumption taxes.  
 
The results of this literature strongly suggest that the distributional effects of New 
Zealand’s non-neutral taxes on residential housing not only depend on the direct effects 
of the taxes but also on the indirect effects stemming from changing land prices. It is 
thus necessary to distinguish between the short run distribution effects of a tax, those 
that occur before property prices change, and the long run effects that incorporate 
changes in land prices. To do this analysis properly requires a full model in which land 
prices adjust in response to taxes, and in which there are agents who differ by income, 
home-ownership status, and, if they own, the extent they are mortgaged. The models also 
have to take into account the way any tax additional taxes are raised or refunded. 
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Typically these models can only be solved under simplifying assumptions; for example, 
Coleman (2010) examines the effect of introducing a capital gains tax under the 
assumptions that there are only two classes of property, that there is no population 
growth, and that all households accurately anticipate future house prices and rents.  
 
This paper does not calculate the distributional effects of the taxation of property income 
in a full general equilibrium model. Rather, it focuses on the key distribution features of 
property income taxes by providing a series of numerical examples that capture the key 
short run and long run effects. The first example shows the effect of exempting imputed 
rent and capital gains from tax within an income tax system.  
 
4.1 Income taxes, housing markets, and distribution  
What are the distributional effects of moving from a neutral income tax system to one in 
which imputed rent and capital gains are exempt from tax?43 Two scenarios are 
presented. To highlight the effects of exempting imputed rent from tax, the first scenario 
assumes there is no ongoing change in property prices, although prices can change in 
response to taxes. To demonstrate the additional effects of exempting capital gains from 
tax, the second scenario assumes property prices increase 1% per year. In each example 
four tables are presented. The first table shows rents, capital incomes, and prices when 
there are no taxes. The second shows the effects on renters, landlords, lenders and three 
classes of owner-occupiers (those with 0%, 50% and 100% equity) when the income tax 
system is neutral. The third table shows what happens when capital gains and imputed 
rents are exempt from tax, assuming the price of property is unchanged. The last table 
shows what might happen to future generations, when property prices have adjusted 
upwards by $100,000 in response to the tax changes, but the rate of capital gains 
continues at either 0% or 1% per annum.  The last table is illustrative; for while prices 
and rents are adjusted so that landlords make the same return as they would from lending 
money, the marginal returns from lending and from investing in larger houses are not 
equated.44 
                                                 
43 If the tax system were neutral with respect to property, (i) rental income net of depreciation, interest 
costs, repairs and maintenance, and property taxes would be taxed; (ii) the imputed rent earned by owner-
occupiers, net of depreciation, interest costs and property taxes would be taxed; and (iii) capital gains 
would be taxed on an accrual basis. 
44 The table is calculated under the assumption that landlords make the same returns from leasing property 
as they would from lending money. In practice, they normally demand an additional premium to reflect the 
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4.1.1 Exempting imputed rent from tax when property prices are stable.  
Table 7a shows outcomes when there are no taxes. The annual benefits provided by 
housing are valued at $22,000; rent and imputed rent are set equal to $20,000, providing a 
consumer surplus of $2,000; interest rates are 5%; and the price of a house is assumed to 
be $400,000.45 In these circumstances a household with $400,000 will be indifferent 
between owning their own home, or renting and either investing in interest earning debt 
or becoming a landlord.  
 
Table 7b shows what happens when a neutral income tax system is introduced, with an 
income tax rate of 30%. It is levied on rents or imputed rent net of other costs including 
interest costs and property taxes. Rents are set at a level that mean the after-tax return to 
the landlord is the same as if they earned interest on the price of a house. To reflect 
current practice in New Zealand, a $2,000 property tax is also imposed on properties; 
this tax is separate from the income tax, and does not alter its distributional neutrality in 
the sense that the incidence of the tax falls equally on owner-occupiers and renters. To 
reflect the effect of the property tax, rents are set at $22,000.  
 
If a tax system is neutral, the relative returns to a landlord and a lender with equal capital, 
and the financial returns to a person choosing either to own or rent and lend their equity, 
should not depend on the tax rate. In Table 7b the tax system is neutral and has no 
effects on house prices, but owners of capital have lower after-tax incomes as they pay 
tax. In column 1, the renter gets $22,000 value from renting the house, but as rent is 
$22,000 their net value is zero. Similarly in column 4 an owner-occupier with zero equity 
gets $22,000 value from owning the house but pays $20,000 in interest and $2,000 in 
property taxes. They pay no income tax. In columns 2, 3, 6, a person with $400,000 gets 
the same return from becoming a landlord, from being an owner-occupier, or from 
lending the money. Note that in column 6 the owner-occupier has to pay $6,000 tax to 
the government every year on their imputed rent. In column 5 an owner occupier with 
$200,000 equity in their house pays $3,000 tax on their net equity position and is left with 
$7,000 after paying tax. 
                                                                                                                                            
risks undertaken. These risk premiums could be incorporated into the analysis without changing the 
qualitative results, but have been omitted for simplicity.  
45 In general the value of housing services will be greater than the value of rent, or else people will not use 
the house. The numbers are chosen to make comparisons easy when taxes are imposed, but none of the 
results are affected by the choice of numbers. 
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Table 7c shows what would happen if the government exempted imputed rent from tax, 
if property prices did not change. This change has four main effects. First, the 
government would lose tax revenue. If it increased income taxes to make up the lost 
revenue, renters, landlords and lenders would pay more income tax but get no advantage 
from the tax exemption and so will be worse off; but owner-occupiers as a class would 
be better off as their tax cuts would be larger than their income tax increases.46 Secondly, 
the tax advantage means renters with some equity will try and become owner-occupiers 
to take advantage of the tax exemption. If property prices did not change, a renter with a 
$200,000 deposit will gain $3,000 per year from becoming an owner-occupier (the 
difference between column 1 plus half of column 3 and column 5). This would lead to an 
increase in owner-occupancy rates. Thirdly, owner-occupiers with surplus funds will have 
an incentive to build and buy bigger houses, because the additional benefits they get from 
these houses are not taxed. As a consequence, the size and quality of the owner-occupied  
housing stock should increase.  Lastly, owner-occupiers will have an incentive to move to 
locations that are conveniently located to desirable amenities, because these benefits are 
also exempt from tax. Since the supply of conveniently located land is largely fixed, this 
will increase land prices and provide a one-off capital gain to existing owners of land.  
 
Table 7d shows the effect of exempting imputed rents on subsequent generations under 
the assumption that prices are bid up to $500,000. Since the characteristics of the 
property do not change, the annual value of living in the house remains the same. In 
aggregate, the increase in house prices must make subsequent generations (and the first 
generation of renters) worse off, assuming the government increases other taxes to offset 
the loss of revenue from exempting imputed rent from tax. In aggregate, these 
generations face an annual loss equal to the interest rate multiplied by the change in 
house prices, as they will pay the same in taxes, but will have to pay more to rent or 
purchase property. This loss is not evenly shared, however.  
 
                                                 
46 About one third of houses in New Zealand are owned without a mortgage, and another third are owned 
with a mortgage. If the size of these mortgages was uniformly distributed, this means the government 
would lose tax revenue of half the imputed rent tax levied on an average house – or $3,000 per household 
in this example. In practice the loss is larger as the houses owned by owner-occupiers are larger on average 
than those owned by renters.  
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(a) The next generation of landlords and lenders will make the same after-tax 
percentage returns, so they will be in an unchanged position.47  Landlords will 
only make the same returns if they increase rents to cover the higher property 
prices, which means rents will increase by $5,000.48 
(b) Renters will be worse off than previously. Rents will increase but the value 
renters will get from the house will be the same. They also will be paying higher 
income taxes than they would if imputed rent were taxed. They will have an 
incentive to become owner-occupiers, but if they are restricted in the amount 
they can borrow, they will be renters for longer as it takes them longer to save a 
deposit to purchase a property (Coleman 2010). 
(c) New generations of owner-occupiers will be worse off than in scenario 7c, as 
they will have to pay more for property.  The effects on their welfare relative to 
the neutral tax regime are ambiguous, for while income taxes will increase and 
they will pay more for property than they otherwise would have paid, they will 
not pay tax on imputed rent. If all members of the new generation become 
owner-occupiers, they will be worse off, as they will pay more for property and 
their total tax bill will be the same.  
 
Overall, the extent that some members of subsequent generations will be better off by 
the tax change will depend on how much house prices increase and how the income tax 
increase is distributed. Renters will almost certainly be worse off relative to a neutral tax 
regime, suggesting the shift from a neutral tax regime will be regressive if renters have 
lower average incomes than owner-occupiers.  
 
4.1.2 Exempting imputed rent and capital gains from tax when property prices appreciate.  
In the second scenario, the value of housing and property prices is assumed to increase at 
1% per annum, and the starting level of house prices is increased to $500,000 to reflect 
the higher discounted value of rents. Table 8a shows the outcomes when there are no 
taxes and Table 8b shows the results of a neutral income tax system in which imputed 
                                                 
47 Table 7d has higher earnings than Tables 7b or 7c as the amount lent has increased from $400,000 to 
$500,000. 
48 Note that this sentence is simply a statement of equation 10, which states that landlords will only enter 
the property market if they make a return similar to that which they expect elsewhere. Even though rents 
and prices are determined simultaneously in the market, equation 10 will hold so long as landlords 
participate in the market, in which case house prices will equal the expected present value of future rent 
streams. In this section it is assumed that property prices increase and therefore that rents must increase if 
landlords are to participate in the market; in more complete models such as Coleman (2010), rents and 
house prices are determined simultaneously subject to the landlord participation constraint. 
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rents, rents, and capital gains are taxed. The rent/property price and imputed 
rent/property price ratios are less than 5 % per annum due to the capital appreciation 
that property owners obtain.  
 
When capital gains and imputed rents are both exempt from tax, landlords as well as 
owner-occupiers pay less tax, but other tax rates increase. Competition between 
landlords to obtain these gains leads to a reduction in the rent/price ratio, either through 
a reduction in rents (if the supply of houses is elastic) or through an increase in prices (if 
it is not). If property prices do not change, rents are reduced until the after tax-return 
from being a landlord equal those obtained from lending and the benefits from 
eliminating capital gains taxes are transferred to renters. The reduction in rents makes 
renters better off relative to low-equity owner-occupiers, and reduces the incentive of 
people with low equity to become owner-occupiers. Consequently, lenders and landlords 
are unambiguously losers from the tax change if property prices do not change, as they 
face higher other taxes. The effects on other groups are ambiguous, and depend on the 
size of capital gains relative to the value of imputed rent.  
 
If property prices increase in response to the tax change, renters will be worse off as they 
will experience higher other taxes without obtaining lower rents. In these circumstances, 
renters with some equity have an incentive to become owner-occupiers, to take 
advantage of the tax exemption on imputed rents and capital gains. Moreover, both 
landlords and owner-occupiers have an incentive to bid up the price of land, providing a 
one-off capital gain to people who own land at the time the tax cuts are introduced. 
 
Table 8d shows the effect on subsequent generations, assuming that base level prices 
increase to $600,000 in response to the incentives for households and landlords to bid up 
property prices. Prices are still assumed to appreciate at 1% per year, and landlords make 
the same after-tax returns from property as if they were lenders. There are three main 
effects.  
 
First, rents will increase by less than the increase in house prices. As landlords are willing 
to accept low rents so they can obtain tax-free capital gains, rents could even fall in 
absolute terms, although they might increase because of the higher property prices.   
 
 40 
Secondly, even ignoring the increase in other taxes which also makes them worse off, 
first home owners with little equity are likely to be worse off than when taxes are neutral, 
because the rise in house prices increases their interest costs by more than they gain from 
the tax reductions. In contrast, the biggest winners - or the smallest losers - are those 
with high equity stakes in owner occupied houses. Their after-tax returns may increase 
because of the tax reduction even though they have spent more on their houses,. When 
the increase in other taxes is taken into account, it is possible that owner-occupiers with 
high equity lose out – and if all households become high equity owner-occupiers it is 
certain they will be worse off.  
 
Thirdly, future generations collectively face a loss from the tax changes to the first 
generation of property owners. Overall they pay similar amounts of tax to government, 
for the reductions in property taxes are offset by increases in income taxes. However, 
they pay higher prices for their properties. This leads to an overall loss of income equal 
to the interest rate on the higher property prices. 
 
4.1.3: The distribution effects of taxing imputed rents and capital gains.  
Tables 7 and 8 show the effects of exempting imputed rent and capital gains from tax. By 
reversing the chain of logic, if New Zealand decided to tax imputed rents and capital 
gains, with the revenue rebated by cutting other taxes, the following distributional effects 
are likely.  
(a) The first generation of owner-occupiers with large equity positions will be worse 
off, as they will pay more in imputed rent taxes than they gain from lower other 
taxes. 
(b) The effect on the first generation of renters is ambiguous. To the extent that 
capital gains taxes are artificially keeping rents low, they will be worse off; to the 
extent that they pay less in other taxes they will be better off.   
(c) There will be a decrease in land prices. 
(d) There will be less incentive to build large or high quality houses, as imputed rent 
will be taxed. 
(e) In the long term, new generations of renters are likely to be better off as they will 
pay lower rents for the same quality rentals and other taxes will be lower. 
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(f) In the long term, new generations of owner-occupiers will be in a mixed position 
to the extent that they have lower income taxes and pay less for property, but 
have to pay tax on imputed rent. Owner-occupiers with little equity are likely to 
gain more than owner-occupiers with high equity.  
(g) In the long term, new generations overall will be better off, as they have the same 
total tax bills but pay lower prices for land and for rent. The flow of gains is equal 
to the size of the land price decrease multiplied by the interest rate. The original 
owners of the land will suffer a loss equal to the discounted sum of the gains of 
all subsequent generations, a loss that reflects the removal of tax concessions that 
artificially raise land prices.  
The distributional results from simply imposing an imputed rent tax are clearer, as in this 
case there would be no effect on short run rents and long run rents would decline in line 
with the decline in property prices.  
 
These results beg the question: if New Zealand currently taxed imputed rent, would there 
be much demand to change the tax system? There is likely to be a political demand from 
the first generation of owner-occupiers to exempt imputed rent from tax, as they would 
gain from reducing the neutrality of the tax system, as they gain a tax break in the short 
run and an increase in property prices in the long run. However, such a move would be 
regressive, if renters are poorer than owner-occupiers, and would introduce distortions 
that lead to houses that are too large and land prices that are too expensive. It would also 
reduce living standards in the long run, by raising the price of property. Given these 
effects, it would be difficult to recommend such a policy unless the administrative costs 
of taxing imputed rent and capital gains were extremely high.  
 
4.2. Expenditure taxes, housing markets, and distribution  
The distributional effects when capital income from sanctioned retirement accounts is 
taxed on an expenditure basis and capital gains and imputed rent are not taxed are 
complex as the tax system lacks a coherent intellectual basis. The tax system is not 
neutral overall, not just because owner-occupied housing and investments in sanctioned 
retirement schemes are taxed on an expenditure basis whereas other asset classes 
including leased residential property are taxed on an income basis, but also because the 
failure to tax capital gains means debt instruments held outside retirement accounts are 
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further disadvantaged. Moreover, most countries limit the amounts that can be deposited 
in retirement schemes that are taxed on an expenditure basis. Since most people do not 
face binding limits on the amounts they can place in sanctioned retirement accounts, at 
the margin they face a tax system that is neutral between investments in housing and 
financial assets but non-neutral to investments in leased residential property or personal 
businesses. In contrast, wealthy households are taxed at the margin on an income tax 
basis so they face a tax system that is non-neutral between owner-occupied housing and 
other assets but which is neutral to investments in leased residential property and other 
equity assets. 
  
Tables 9 and 10 shows the effects of taxing rental properties on an income basis (with an 
exemption for capital gains) when owner occupied housing and interest earnings in 
sanctioned retirement income funds are taxed on an expenditure basis. In Table 9 there 
is no increase in property prices; a house costs $400,000 and provides annual rental 
services valued at $20,000. In Table 10 property prices and the value of rental services 
increase by 1% per year; rental services start at $20,000, and the price of the property is 
$500,000. Each table is broken into three sections and considers the returns to four 
classes of assets: owner-occupied property; deposits held in retirement accounts that are 
taxed on an EET basis; other deposits; and rental property. Because the difference in 
after-tax returns in income tax and expenditure tax systems depends on the investment 
horizon, results are calculated assuming a ten year horizon.  
 
In the first section, all assets are taxed on an expenditure basis. The tax system is neutral 
and the returns to investing in owner-occupied housing, rental property, or interest 
earning deposits are the same.49  
 
In the second section, the marginal landlord is someone who cannot place additional 
funds in a sanctioned retirement scheme and whose alternative investments are taxed on 
an income tax basis. Rents are set so that the after-tax returns from investing in rental 
property are the same as the after tax returns from deposits taxed on an income basis. In 
these circumstances the rent on a property will remain $20,000 if there is no capital 
appreciation or decline to $17,857 if there is capital appreciation. The decline in rents 
                                                 
49 Note in the first section of Table 9 and 10 a landlord who has enough money to purchase an owner-
occupied house out of tax paid money has enough money to purchase 1/(1-τ) = 1.43 houses out of pretax 
money. The rent per house is therefore $20,000.   
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occurs because the capital gain is not taxed, and landlords have an incentive to reduce the 
rent/price ratio to obtain tax-free capital gains rather than invest in debt securities that 
are subject to income tax. Irrespective of the rate of capital appreciation, the returns to a 
landlord are lower than the expected returns from investing in owner-occupied housing 
or from placing funds in a retirement fund that is taxed on an EET basis. This makes it 
unlikely that these landlords would be the marginal players in the property market. Nor 
do ordinary households have an incentive to purchase larger houses or bid property 
prices above the levels that would prevail under a neutral tax system, as they are taxed on 
an equal basis whether they place funds in a retirement income fund or an owner-
occupied house. Consequently, in these circumstances it seems unlikely that the tax 
system would produce incentives to bid property prices above the tax-neutral level.  
 
In the third section the marginal landlord is someone whose alternative investments are 
taxed on an expenditure basis. Rents are set so that the after-tax returns from investing in 
rental property are the same as the after tax returns from deposits taxed on an 
expenditure basis. In these circumstances, the rent/price ratio increases relative to the 
neutral case, as rents are increased (to $28,571) to pay the income taxes, and the returns 
are higher than the returns from investing in deposits that are taxed on an income basis.  
 
These results show the effect on rents and property prices of a mixed expenditure and 
income tax regime are crucially dependent on the identity of the marginal investor. If the 
marginal investor is someone who cannot place additional funds in a sanctioned 
retirement scheme, rent/price ratios will be similar or lower than in the neutral case, and 
overall returns will be lower than the returns from owner-occupied housing or a 
sanctioned retirement scheme. In these circumstances, residential property is likely to be 
a minority investment class, and investors seem unlikely to place significant upward 
pressure on property prices as property is tax-disadvantaged relative to funds in 
retirement schemes. Alternately, if the marginal investor is someone whose alternative 
investment is a sanctioned retirement scheme, rent/price ratios will be higher than when 
the tax system is neutral, either because rents are high or because there is downward 
pressure on house prices. In neither case, therefore, is the tax system likely to place the 
type of upward pressure on house prices generated by New Zealand’s current tax system.  
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Which of the marginal conditions rent/price conditions is most likely to have 
characterised New Zealand prior to 1989? At the time there were relatively few private 
landlords, approximately 60,000, partly because owner-occupancy rates were high and 
partly because a large number of rental properties were owned by the state. This suggests 
that the returns to rental properties were probably set in reference to the returns available 
from alternative investments that were taxed on an income tax basis. Given the high 
rates of inflation prevailing in the 1970s and 1980s, rent/price ratios would be lower than 
those prevailing under a neutral tax system; but there would be little pressure for 
landlords to outcompete owner-occupiers, as after-tax returns to owner-occupiers would 
be higher than those to landlords.  
 
4.3. The Distribution Effects of the Great Income Tax Experiment  
What, then, are the distributional effects of taxing retirement income schemes on an 
expenditure basis? The answer depends on the tax scheme to which it is compared. 
There are three obvious benchmarks: a neutral expenditure tax system; a neutral income 
tax system; and New Zealand’s current tax system. The comparisons are most easily 
made by noting that an EET retirement income tax scheme can be transformed into 
New Zealand’s current tax scheme through a series of three steps: 
(a) a shift from an EET retirement income tax scheme to a neutral expenditure tax 
scheme, by taxing other capital income on an expenditure rather than income 
basis;   
(b) a shift from a neutral expenditure tax scheme to a neutral income tax scheme; 
and  
(c) a shift from a neutral income tax scheme to New Zealand’s current tax scheme, 
by exempting imputed rent and capital gains from tax. 
 
Figures 8 and 9 indicate schematically how different classes of income would be taxed 
under these tax regimes.50 Figure 8 shows tax rates when sanctioned retirement income 
schemes are taxed on an expenditure basis but other capital income is taxed on an 
income basis (with an exemption for capital gains), along with a neutral expenditure tax 
system. The neutral scheme should have higher statutory rates than the EET retirement 
income scheme, as less revenue is received from the taxation of other capital income. 
Consequently an EET retirement income tax scheme is likely to be more progressive 
                                                 
50 The diagram is schematic as the numbers are made up. They are designed to indicate how changes from 
neutral tax systems affect different types of income.  
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than the neutral scheme, as it has lower tax rates on labour incomes but higher tax rates 
on capital incomes earned from assets held outside retirement scheme. As discussed in 
section 4.2, it may also place slight downwards pressure on land prices.  
 
Standard theory suggests that a neutral expenditure tax scheme will have higher tax rates 
than a neutral income tax system, due to difference in the timing of income tax receipts, 
but neither should affect land prices.51 The lower tax rates means a neutral income tax 
scheme is likely to be more progressive than a neutral expenditure tax system, as saving 
rates typically increase with income. A neutral income tax scheme is also likely to be 
more progressive than an EET retirement income tax scheme since the taxes on capital 
gains and imputed rent will fall disproportionately on high income people.  
 
Figure 9 shows the effects of New Zealand’s current tax system and a neutral income tax 
system in which both capital gains and imputed rent are taxed. The current tax system is 
more regressive than a neutral income tax system as the exemption of imputed rent and 
capital gains from tax favours high income households and leads to higher labour income 
taxes. For this reason, shifting from an EET retirement income scheme to New 
Zealand’s current tax system has ambiguous effects on distribution, even if the effect on 
land prices is ignored. It may be a regressive change, due to the increase in labour income 
taxes that occurs when retirement savings are not taxed at the time that income is earned; 
but it may not, as imputed rent and capital gains are exempt from tax under the current 
income tax system. In either case, the exemption of imputed rent and capital gains from 
taxation significantly reduces any distributional advantages that could be achieved when a 
government switches the tax system from an expenditure tax basis to an income tax 
basis.  
 
It is not possible to ignore the effect on land prices, however.  In line with Feldstein’s 
(1977) conjecture, when retirement income schemes are taxed on an expenditure basis 
there is likely to be slight downward pressure on property prices. In contrast, when 
retirement schemes are taxed on an income basis but imputed rent and capital gains are 
exempt from tax, there is likely to be upward pressure on property prices. A switch from 
an EET retirement income tax scheme to New Zealand’s current tax system will 
therefore have a slightly larger effect on land prices than that discussed in section 2, 
                                                 
51 See, for instance, Batina and Ihori (2000). 
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which compared New Zealand’s current tax system with a neutral income tax system. 
According to the calculations in Table 2b, this means that the current tax system could 
more than double the willingness of owner-occupiers to pay for land with a high 
marginal convenience yield relative to a tax system in which retirement income schemes 
are taxed on an expenditure basis.  
 
It will be recalled that the 1987 Labour Government and the 1988 Brash Committee 
both argued that it was regressive to tax retirement income schemes on an expenditure 
basis, as these schemes were primarily used by people on higher incomes. They may have 
been wrong. It appears they may have substantially underestimated how the incidence of 
the tax change could have been shifted within cohorts and across generations by the 
induced change in land prices.  If so, it was a mistake that inadvertently benefited the 
generation of property owners alive at the time, and probably those who purchased 
property in the subsequent decade while the New Zealand economy was still reeling 
from the effects of the early 1990s financial crisis and a period of extraordinarily high real 
interest rates. The benefits to these generations, however, come at the expense of all 
subsequent generations. The losses to these generations in terms of the higher land 
prices they have paid and will have to pay are most likely to be greater than any 
redistribution gains stemming from taxing retirement saving accounts on an income 
rather an expenditure basis.  
 
5. Conclusion. 
It is a standard adage of economists that the incidence of a tax will fall on people 
different to those paying the tax whenever a tax causes prices to change. Nowhere is this 
adage more important than when taxes affect the price of land, for taxes that affect the 
price of land shift the incidence of the tax across generations.  As Feldstein (1977) and 
Skinner (1996) observed, tax incentives favouring property should be capitalized into 
property values, reducing the welfare of future generations, who would prefer to buy 
land cheap and sell cheap rather than buy land dear and sell dear. They further argued the 
higher price of land should reduce the country’s capital stock and lower the net foreign 
asset position. While the intergenerational consequences of such policies should be a 
central feature of fiscal policy analysis, they are frequently ignored as the resource 
transfers induced by tax policy are not always directly associated with payments to the 
government. A policy that exempts land income from tax will reduce the welfare of all 
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generations but the first generation of landowners, for instance, without ever generating 
payments that are counted in standard analyses of government taxes and transfers.  
 
New Zealand’s tax changes in the late 1980s are likely to have had significant 
intergenerational consequences through their effects on land pries. By taxing retirement 
savings on an income basis without simultaneously taxing imputed rent or capital gains, 
New Zealand adopted a tax system that differentially favours income from residential 
property. This means the tax advantage of residential property relative to other asset 
classes is now greater in New Zealand than it is in most OECD countries. Some of this 
advantage may have been inadvertent, since it proved politically impossible to introduce 
simultaneously a tax on capital gains or imputed rent, the steps needed to adopted a 
neutral income tax system. Inadvertent or not, most formal models analysing the 
consequences of a non-neutral income tax system suggest they will lead to an increase in 
the marginal price of conveniently located land. In places where use of the transport 
system is close to capacity, or where amenities are concentrated, the tax system is likely 
to lead to significant increases in land prices.    
 
It is disappointing that the empirical evidence about the effect of the 1989 tax change is 
so inconclusive. There is clear evidence that the average size of new construction 
increased sharply relative to Australia and the United States after 1989; there is clear 
evidence that property prices increased more rapidly after 1990 than before 1990, with 
most of the increase occurring after 2000; and there is clear evidence that rent/price 
ratios decreased significantly; and the number of private landlords increased rapidly. All 
these changes are consistent with the predicted effects of the 1989 tax changes. But so 
many other macroeconomic changes occurred at around the same time that the 
econometric evidence is not even strong enough to definitively link the size of new 
construction or the rent/price ratio to real interest rates, let alone tax changes. A 
different econometric approach will be needed to unpick the relationships. 
 
Both the 2001 Tax Review and the 2010 Tax Working Group conceded it would be 
difficult to gain a political consensus to tax imputed rents from owner-occupied housing 
or to apply a capital gains tax to all assets including owner-occupied housing, and these 
taxes have not been imposed. This means New Zealand still has a tax system that is very 
distortionary towards residential property. This leaves the country with four tax reform 
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options. The first option is to do nothing. This option is likely to be most attractive to 
current land-owners, as they are favoured by the current tax system, but it is likely to be 
less attractive to current and future generations of young people who face higher housing 
prices. The second option is to finish the job started in 1989 and tax all capital income 
consistently. This means introducing a capital gains tax on an accrual basis and taxing 
imputed rent, or taxing housing using a risk free return method, using the revenues to 
reduce income tax rates further. The third option is to adopt a series of partial ‘fixes’ 
which reduce the tax advantage of housing but do not address the fundamental issue. For 
example, the treatment of the tax losses for landlords who have extensive debt could be 
changed. Or a land tax could be introduced.52 The fourth option is to admit the great 
income tax experiment of 1989 has not worked as intended, because it proved too 
difficult to tax capital incomes properly, and undo the reforms. The simplest way to 
undo the reforms is to tax some income placed in retirement income saving schemes on 
an EET basis.53  This reform will reduce the distortions that favour owner-occupied 
housing by taxing other assets on a similar basis, but will require increases in other taxes 
to make up the revenue shortfall. None of these options are entirely attractive. But, after 
a quarter of a century, it is surely time to evaluate whether the great income tax 
experiment has succeeded as intended. If not, perhaps it is time to urgently pursue 
further income tax reforms – or admit it has not worked as planned, and consider 
reverting back to the tax approach adopted by the rest of the world.  
 
This paper has not provided a full analysis of the consequences of changing the tax 
system, either by taxing housing on an income basis or by taxing retirement saving on an 
expenditure basis. This analysis would need to include estimates of the effects of 
changing taxes on labour participation rates and labour income as well the effects of 
different tax systems on housing markets and other capital investments. Such a model 
would be extremely technically demanding and is beyond the scope of the current paper. 
Nonetheless, as it is likely that there would be large economic consequences if retirement 
                                                 
52 Coleman and Grimes (2010) provides an analysis of the possible effects of different variants of land 
taxes in a New Zealand setting. A more general treatment is provided by Dye and England (2009). These 
authors are favourably disposed to the introduction of a land tax, arguing it is an efficient way of raising 
revenue. In most cases, a land tax can be expected to reduce land prices (although counter-examples are 
possible: see Chamley and Wright (1987) or Petrucci (2005)). It should be noted that a land tax could be 
introduced even if the tax treatment of capital income was not distortionary.   
53 A referee pointed out that it may be possible tax retirement savings on an expenditure basis using the 
same pre-payment option that is applied to housing: that is, a “Taxed-Exempt-Exempt” method. There is 
an attractive symmetry to this proposition so long as households cannot borrow to place funds in a 
retirement income account that is taxed on this basis, but deduct interest payments against income tax.  
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saving were taxed differently, a proper analysis of these effects (including, for instance, 
the fiscal effects, the effects on labour supply of other compensating tax changes, and the 
transitional changes that might occur as the economy moved from one tax regime to 
another) would be useful. It is clear the adverse consequences of the 1989 tax regime 
shift were not fully anticipated or else the change may not have been undertaken; this 
experience suggests that any future tax changes should be properly understood before 
they are implemented.  Fortunately, it should not be presumed that changing the tax 
system would be detrimental to the New Zealand economy. There is a long-standing and 
widespread belief amongst economists that expenditure taxes are less distorting than 
income taxes, and OECD experience suggests it is easy in practice to tax retirement 
savings on an expenditure basis. It is therefore to be hoped that the findings from this 
paper provide a basis for a further investigation of the desirability of ending (or, perhaps, 
continuing) New Zealand’s great income tax experiment.  
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Figure 2: Real Property Prices in New Zealand, 1923 – 2014 
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Figure 3: Real rents and real house prices, 1975 – 2014 
Real rents and real house prices, 1975 - 2014























Figure 4: Rent/House-price ratio versus real mortgage rates 1975- 2014 
The blue-circle line traces the path of real interest rates and the rent/house-price ratio, 1975-1990. The 
red-square line traces the path from 1990 – 2015.  
 
 

































Figure 5: Average new house size, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 


























Figure 6: Average new house size, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, 
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Figure 7: Average building permit size versus real mortgage rates , 1975-2014 
 
 













The blue-circle line traces the path of real interest rates and the rent/house-price ratio, 1975-1990. The 





















EET neutral  
 
Note: The tax rate on labour income when earned is lower than the tax rate on labour income (average) as 
taxes are paid when the income is spent  and this will be a later date if some of the income is saved. 
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Table 1: the effect of taxes on the housing marginal utility/price ratio. 
 ( ) ( )





 1991-2000 π = 1.8 % 
i  = 7.0 % 
2001-2010 
π = 2.7 % 
i  = 5.9 % 
2011-2015 
π = 1.1 % 
i  = 4.0 % 
(1)Neutral taxes 
 
i δ δπ π+ + −  7.8% 5.8% 5.5% 
(2) Neutral taxes 
+property tax 
Li δ δπ π τ+ + − +  8.3% 6.3% 6.0% 
(3) Current income 
taxes 








(4) Ratio (3)/(2) 
 
 72% 69% 78% 
(5) Current taxes + 
CGT 
(1 )( ) Liτ δ δπ π τ− + + − +  5.7% 4.4% 4.2% 
(6)Current taxes + 
imputed rent tax 
(1 )
1 L
iτ δ δπ π τ
τ
− + + −
+
−
 8.7% 6.2% 6.7% 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 2a: the effect of taxes on the marginal land price/ convenience yield ratio. 
Ongoing property price increases g = 0% 
 ( ) ( )







π = 1.8 % 
i  = 7.0 % 
2001-2010 
π = 2.7 % 
i  = 5.9 % 
2011-2015 
π = 1.1 % 




( )i g gπ π− + +
 19.0 31.1 34.0 
(2) Neutral taxes 
+property tax 
1
( ) Li g gπ π τ− + + +
 17.3 26.9 29.1 
(3) Current taxes 
1
(1 ) ( ) Li g gτ π π τ− − + + +
 29.0 56.8 47.1 
(4) Ratio (3)/(2) 
 
 1.6 2.1 1.6 
(5) Current taxes + 
CGT 
1
(1 )( ) Li g gτ π π τ− − + + +
 24.8 37.7 40.5 
(6)Current taxes + 
imputed rent tax 
1
(1 )( ) ( )Li g g
τ
τ τ π π
−
− + − + +
 
20.4 42.0 34.2 
 
Table 2b: the effect of taxes on the marginal land price/ convenience yield ratio. 
Ongoing property price increases g = 1% 
 ( ) ( )







π = 1.8 % 
i  = 7.0 % 
2001-2010 
π = 2.7 % 
i  = 5.9 % 
2011-2015 
π = 1.1 % 




( )i g gπ π− + +
 23.5 45.7 51.8 
(2) Neutral taxes 
+property tax 
1
( ) Li g gπ π τ− + + +
 21.1 37.2 41.2 
(3) Current taxes 
1
(1 ) ( ) Li g gτ π π τ− − + + +
 41.2 136.4 89.9 
(4) Ratio (3)/(2) 
 
 2.0 3.7 2.1 
(5) Current taxes + 
CGT 
1
(1 )( ) Li g gτ π π τ− − + + +
 29.9 50.8 55.8 
(6)Current taxes + 
imputed rent tax 
1
(1 )( ) ( )Li g g
τ
τ τ π π
−
− + − + +
 
29.6 117.9 70.7 











π = 1.8 % 
i  = 7.0 % 
2001-2010 
π = 2.7 % 
i  = 5.9 % 
2011-2015 
π = 1.1 % 
i  = 4.0 % 
 long run real growth in land prices g = 0% 















4.4% 1.9% 2.4% 
(3) Ratio (2)/(1)  84% 59% 82% 
 long run real growth in land prices g = 1% 















2.9% 0.3% 0.9% 
(3) Ratio (2)/(1)  68% 16% 47% 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 4: Selected measures of Household Wealth, 1998- 2015. 
 1998 2007 2015 
Population 3,846,100 4,240,000 4,633,900 
Nominal GDP $111,157m $183,333m $247,436m 
    
Housing and Land Value $221,000m $613,678m $873,190m 
- Ratio to GDP 1.99 3.35 3.53 
    
Value of equity in businesses 
(includes equity in rental property) $123,618m $303,577m $372,844m 
Equity in Superannuation and 
insurance funds $42,804m $41,142m $75,272m 
Deposits $44,941m $95,079m $151,755m 
Liabilities $44,991m $121,320m $163,166m 
Net Financial Wealth  
(includes equity in rental property) $172,745m $340,753m $461,249m 
    
Total Net Wealth  $349,149m $817,690m $1,118,487m 
- Ratio to GDP 3.14 4.46 4.52 
Net Wealth excluding value of land $128,149m $204,012m $245,297m 
- Ratio to GDP 1.15 1.11 0.99 
 
Source: Population and Nominal GDP data are from Statistics New Zealand, series DPE059AA and 




Table 5: Annual average property price increases in New Zealand, 1923 – 2014 
 
 House prices 1923 – 2014 
 
 Nominal increase Inflation Real increase 
1923:2 – 1963:2  3.7% 2.2% 1.5% 
1962:2 – 1990:2 11.1% 9.7% 1.3% 
1990:2 – 2014:4 5.7% 2.1% 3.5% 
    
1975:1 – 1990:2 11.3% 12.2% -0.8% 
1990:2 – 2000:1 4.3% 1.7% 2.5% 
2000:1 – 2014:4 6.7% 2.4% 4.2% 
 Rents, 1975 – 2014 
 
 Nominal increase Inflation Real increase 
1975:1 – 1990:2 13.2% 12.2% 0.9% 
1990:2 – 2000:1 4.0% 1.7% 2.3% 
2000:1 – 2014:4 1.4% 2.4% -1.0% 
Source: Author’s calculations. The raw data for the period 1923 – 1962 are the average price of urban 
properties transferred under the Land Transfer Act using data obtained from the New Zealand Official 
Year Book and the Abstract of Statistics published by the New Zealand Department of Statistics. The data 
from 1962 – 2014 are a quality adjusted index using data compiled by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
from Quotable Value. See section 3.1 for more details.  
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Table 6: International House Price changes, 1975 – 2016 
 
 Percentage change in real house prices 
 1975:1 – 1990:1 1990:1- 1997:1 1990:1 – 2000:1 1990:1 – 2016:3 
Australia 46% -3% 16% 157% 
Belgium 24% 22% 41% 120% 
Canada 46% -20% -15% 106% 
Croatia 1% 28% 26% 23% 
Denmark -10% 22% 42% 97% 
Finland 61% -37% -18% 21% 
France 35% -10% 4% 82% 
Germany 1% 1% -1% 1% 
Ireland 24% 31% 128% 176% 
Israel 14% 79% 66% 159% 
Italy 3% -16% -13% -8% 
Japan 51% -11% -17% -47% 
Luxembourg 115% 12% 21% 145% 
Netherlands 11% 41% 96% 111% 
New Zealand -14% 32% 30% 221% 
Norway 12% 3% 25% 138% 
South Korea 79% -37% -50% -35% 
South Africa -35% -21% -12% 87% 
Spain -35% -12% 0% 24% 
Sweden -1% -27% -7% 112% 
Switzerland 51% -34% -36% -2% 
U.K. 69% -19% 8% 104% 
U.S.A. 23% 1% 12% 39% 
Source:  The data used to produce the table are from the International House Price Database produced by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas using methodology described in Mack and Martínez-García (2011). 
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Table 7a. No taxes: house price = $400,000 with no capital appreciation 
Housing services $22,000 $0 $0 $22,000 $22,000 $22,000 
Rent/interest earning  $20,000 $20,000    
Rent/interest cost -$20,000 $0 $0 -$20,000 -$10,000 $0 
Property Tax  $0  $0 $0 $0 
Tax $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Capital gain $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Tax $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Net return/ cost after 
tax 
$2,000 $20,000 $20,000 $2,000 $12,000 $22,000 
 
Table 7b. Imputed rent is taxed (and interest payments on a mortgage are deducted):  house price = $400,000 
with no capital appreciation. 
Housing services $22,000 $0 $0 $22,000 $22,000 $22,000 
Rent/interest earning  $22,000 $20,000    
Rent/interest cost -$22,000 $0 $0 -$20,000 -$10,000 $0 
Property Tax  -$2,000  -$2,000 -$2,000 -$2,000 
Income Tax $0 -$6,000 -$6,000 $0 -$3,000 -$6,000 
Net return/ cost after 
tax 
$0 $14,000 $14,000 $0 $7,000 $14,000 
 
Table 7c. Imputed rent is exempt from tax (and interest is not deducted): house price = $400,000, with no 
capital appreciation. 
Housing services $22,000 $0 $0 $22,000 $22,000 $22,000 
Rent/interest earning  $22,000 $20,000    
Rent/interest cost -$22,000 $0 $0 -$20,000 -$10,000 $0 
Property Tax  -$2,000  -$2,000 -$2,000 -$2,000 
Income Tax $0 -$6,000 -$6,000 $0 $0 $0 
Net return/ cost after 
tax 
$0 $14,000 $14,000 $0 $10,000 $20,000 
 

























Housing services $22,000  $0 $22,000 $22,000 $22,000 
Rent/interest earning  $27,000 $25,000    
Rent/interest cost -$27,000 $0 $0 -$25,000 -$12,500 $0 
Property Tax  -$2,000  -$2,000 -$2,000 -$2,000 
Income Tax $0 -$7500 -$7,500 $0 $0 $0 
Net return/ cost after 
tax 
-$5,000 $17,500 $17,500 -$5,000 $7,500 $20,000 
Source: Author’s calculations.  
 70 
Table 8: The effect of not taxing imputed rent in an environment with capital 























Table 8a. No taxes: house price = $500,000 and increases at 1% per year 
Housing services $22,000 $0 $0 $22,000 $22,000 $22,000 
Rent/interest earning  $20,000 $25,000    
Rent/interest cost -$20,000 $0 $0 -$25,000 -$12,500 $0 
Property Tax  $0  $0 $0 $0 
Income Tax $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Capital gain $0 $5,000 $0 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 
Capital Gain Tax  $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Net return/ cost after 
tax 
$2,000 $25,000 $25,000 $2,000 $14,500 $27,000 
 
Table 8b. Imputed rent and capital gains are taxed: house price = $500,000 and increases at 1% per year 
Housing services $22,000 $0 $0 $22,000 $22,000 $22,000 
Rent/interest earning  $22,000 $25,000    
Rent/interest cost -$22,000 $0 $0 -$25,000 -$12,500 $0 
Property Tax  -$2,000  -$2,000 -$2,000 -$2,000 
Income Tax $0 -$6,000 -$7,500 $1,500 -$2,250 -$6,000 
Capital gain $0 $5,000 $0 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 
Capital Gain Tax  $0 -$1,500 $0 -$1,500 -$1,500 -$1,500 
Net return/ cost after 
tax 
$0 $17,500 $17,500 $0 $8,750 $17,500 
 
Table 8c. No imputed rent or capital gains tax – house price: $500,000 and increases at 1% per year 
Housing services $22,000 $0 $0 $22,000 $22,000 $22,000 
Rent/interest earning  $19,857 $25,000    
Rent/interest cost -$19,857 $0 $0 -$25,000 -$12,500 $0 
Property Tax  -$2,000  -$2,000 -$2,000 -$2,000 
Tax $0 -$5,357 -$7,500 $0 $0 $0 
Capital gain $0 $5,000 $0 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 
Capital Gain Tax $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Net return/ cost after 
tax 
$2,143 $17,500 $17,500 $0 $12,500 $25,000 
 
Table 8d. No imputed rent or capital gains tax: house price = $600,000 and increases at 1% per annum 
Housing services $22,000 $0 $0 $22,000 $22,000 $22,000 
Rent/interest earning  $23,428 $30,000    
Rent/interest cost -$23,428 $0 $0 -$30,000 -$15,000 $0 
Property Tax  -$2,000  -$2,000 -$2,000 -$2,000 
Tax $0 -$6,428 -$9,000 $0   
Capital gain $0 $6,000 $0 $6,000 $6,000 $6,000 
Tax $0 $0 $0 $0   
Net return/ cost after 
tax 
-$1,428 $21,000 $21,000 -$4,000 $11,000 $26,000 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 9: Housing returns with expenditure taxes: no capital gains 






Table 9a: Rents, housing, and all lending are taxed on an expenditure basis. 
 Tax EET EET EET TEE 
Labour 
Income 
Pre-tax income $571,429 $571,429 $571,429 $571,429 
Tax $0 $0 $0 $171,429 
After tax income $571,429 $571,429 $571,429 $400,000 
 Number of houses 1.43 0 0 1 
Capital 
Income 
Rental income $28,571   $20,000 
Interest income $0 $28,571 $28,571 $0 
Tax $0 $0 $0 $0 
Capital gains $0 $0 $0 $0 
After tax income $28,571 $28,571 $28,571 $20,000 
Annual return 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 
Total 
Return 
Compound return $930,797 $930,797 $930,797 $651,558 
Tax $279,239 $279,239 $279,239 $0 
After tax return $651,558 $651,558 $651,558 $651,558 
 
Table 9b: Rents and other lending are  taxed on an income basis. Rents set to equate returns with other lending. 
 Tax TTE EET TTE TEE 
Labour 
Income 
Pre-tax income $571,429 $571,429 $571,429 $571,429 
Tax $171,429 $0 $171,429 $171,429 
After tax income $400,000 $571,429 $400,000 $400,000 
 Number of houses 1.00 0 0 1 
Capital 
Income 
Rental income $20,000   $20,000 
Interest income $0 $28,571 $20,000 $0 
Tax $6,000 $0 $6,000 $0 
Capital gains $0 $0th                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                $0 $0 
After tax income $14,000 $28,571 $14,000 $20,000 
Annual return 3.50% 5.00% 3.50% 5.00% 
Total 
Return 
Compound return $564,240 $930,797 $564,240 $651,558 
Tax $0 $279,239 $0 $0 
After tax return $564,240 $651,558 $564,240 $651,558 
 
Table 9c: Rents and other lending is taxed on an income basis. Rents set to equate returns with lending in retirement 
scheme. 
 Tax TTE EET TTE TEE 
Labour 
Income 
Pre-tax income $571,429 $571,429 $571,429 $571,429 
Tax $171,429 $0 $171,429 $171,429 
After tax income $400,000 $571,429 $400,000 $400,000 
 Number of houses 1.00 0 0 1 
Capital 
Income 
Rental income $28,571   $20,000 
Interest income $0 $28,571 $20,000 $0 
Tax $8,571 $0 $6,000 $0 
Capital gains $0 $0 $0 $0 
After tax income $20,000 $28,571 $14,000 $20,000 
Annual return 5.00% 5.00% 3.50% 5.00% 
Total 
Return 
Compound return $651,558 $930,797 $564,240 $651,558 
Tax $0 $279,239 $0 $0 
After tax return $651,558 $651,558 $564,240 $651,558 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 10: Housing returns with expenditure taxes: property appreciates at 1% per year 






Table 10a: Rents and all lending is taxed on an expenditure basis 
 Tax EET EET EET TEE 
Labour 
Income 
Pre-tax income $714,286 $714,286 $714,286 $714,286 
Tax $0 $0 $0 $214,286 
After tax income $714,286 $714,286 $714,286 $500,000 
 Number of houses 1.43 0 0 1 
Capital 
Income 
Rental income $28,571   $20,000 
Interest income $0 $35,714 $35,714 $0 
Tax $0 $0 $0 $0 
Capital gains $7,143 $0 $0 $5,000 
After tax income $35,714 $35,714 $35,714 $25,000 
Annual return 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 
Total 
Return 
Compound return $1,163,496 $1,163,496 $1,163,496 $814,447 
Tax $349,049 $349,049 $349,049 $0 
After tax return $814,447 $814,447 $814,447 $814,447 
 
Table 10b: Rents and other lending is taxed on an income basis. Rents set to equate returns with other lending 
 Tax TTE EET TTE TEE 
Labour 
Income 
Pre-tax income $714,286 $714,286 $714,286 $714,286 
Tax $214,286 $0 $214,286 $214,286 
After tax income $500,000 $714,286 $500,000 $500,000 
 Number of houses 1 0 0 1 
Capital 
Income 
Rental income $17,857   $20,000 
Interest income $0 $35,714 $25,000 $0 
Tax $5,357 $0 $7,500 $0 
Capital gains $5,000 $0 $0 $5,000 
After tax income $17,500 $35,714 $17,500 $25,000 
Annual return 3.50% 5.00% 3.50% 5.00% 
Total 
Return 
Compound return $705,299 $1,163,496 $705,299 $814,447 
Tax $0 $349,049 $0 $0 
After tax return $705,299 $814,447 $705,299 $814,447 
 
Table 10c: Rents and other lending is taxed on an income basis. Rents set to equate returns with lending in retirement 
scheme 
 Tax TTE EET TTE TEE 
Labour 
Income 
Pre-tax income $714,286 $714,286 $714,286 $714,286 
Tax $214,286 $0 $214,286 $214,286 
After tax income $500,000 $714,286 $500,000 $500,000 
 Number of houses 1.00 0 0 1 
Capital 
Income 
Rental income $28,571   $20,000 
Interest income $0 $35,714 $25,000 $0 
Tax $8,571 $0 $7,500 $0 
Capital gains $5,000 $0 $0 $5,000 
After tax income $25,000 $35,714 $17,500 $25,000 
Annual return 5.00% 5.00% 3.50% 5.00% 
Total 
Return 
Compound return $814,447 $1,163,496 $705,299 $814,447 
Tax $0 $349,049 $0 $0 
After tax return $814,447 $814,447 $705,299 $814,447 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Appendix 1: Capital gains taxes, and the distortionary effects of income taxes 
This appendix, based on Samuelson (1964), provides a simple mathematical description 
of the way income taxes distort capital income decisions by providing an incentive to 
invest in low-returning long-horizon investments. 
  
Suppose a firm undertakes an activity that generates a cash-flow return at one of three 
different horizons. The firm can invest any cash it receives at an interest rate i, and pays 
tax on income at rate τ. Assume that the inflation rate is zero so the real interest rate r is 
equal to the nominal rate i (this assumption is modified later). The three different 
horizons are: 
 
(i) the activity produces a return Y0 in period t and nothing thereafter;  
(ii) the activity produces a return YT in period t+T and nothing thereafter; 
(iii) the activity produces an infinitely lived asset that generates a sequence of 
equal dividends D each period ({Yt+1= D, Yt+2= D, Yt+3= D ….}). 
 
Let V1(τ), V2(τ) and V3(τ) be the present value of the three assets as a function of the 
income tax rate τ.  In the absence of tax, the present value of the three assets is: 
 
(i) 1 0(0)V Y=          (1) 




















+∑        (3) 
To enable a comparison of the effects of inflation, assume that the three assets have the 









= .  
 
The value of each of the assets when there is an income tax is calculated by discounting 
the after-tax return from the activities by the after-tax discount rate, as this is the rate of 
return that the firm can obtain if it invests its cash flows. Since the firm gets an after-tax 
return of r(1-τ) from lending money, the present after-tax value of the various activities 
to the agent are  
(i) 1 0( ) (1 ) (1 ) (0)V Y Vτ τ τ= − = −        (4) 
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(ii) 2
(1 ) (1 )( ) (1 ). (0)










= = −  + −+ −  


















+ −∑       (6) 
 
The after-tax returns are unequal, even though the tax rate on all cash flows are the same. 
The after-tax returns of investments with the same pre-tax returns are different because 
money lent at interest compounds at an after-tax rather than pre-tax rate of return. This 
provides an incentive to invest in low-yielding long-term assets (especially indefinitely 
lived assets) rather than higher-yielding short-term assets even though tax is paid on all 
current and future earnings.54 
 
Samuelson (1964) demonstrated that this distortion could be corrected by an accrual-
based capital gains tax that allows for the deduction of depreciation and losses, as this 
will ensure all activities have the same post tax returns. He further showed that if capital 
gains are taxed as income, (i) the present value of all assets will be independent of the tax 
rate, even if different agents have different tax rates, and equal to the value of the asset in 
the absence of taxes; and (ii) assets valued as the present value of future cash flows will 
have an after-tax return of r(1-τ). It is relatively straightforward to demonstrate these 
results for the above assets, as the two examples in Box 1 show. In turn, it follows that a 
capital gains tax (i) corrects the incentive for agents to favour the production of long 
lived assets over short term assets or current activity, and thus removes the incentive to 
produce low yielding long term assets because of their tax advantages; and (ii) raises 
additional revenue for the government.  
 
2.2 Using accrual-based capital gains taxes to complement income taxes when 
inflation is non-zero.  
When there is general inflation, the taxation of the full nominal return on interest 
earning assets causes a further distortion to asset allocation that can be addressed with 
 
                                                 
54 Note that when inflation is zero the value of an infinitely lived asset returning a constant dividend is 
independent of the tax rate even though the future cash-flows and dividends are taxed. The value of the 
asset is unchanged because the returns on alternative investments are also taxed. The case with inflation is 
considered below.  
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Box 1: The effect of capital gains taxes on asset values in the absence of inflation 
This box calculates the value of an asset when a firm undertakes an activity to produce an 
income producing asset and (i) capital gains tax is paid at time t on the value of the newly 
created asset, (ii) income tax is paid on the income stream produced by the asset, and (iii) 
capital gains tax is paid on any change in value of the asset.  
 
Example 1: An asset returning a sum Y1 in period t+1 (i.e. a type 2 asset with T=1).  
Let *2tV be the value at time t of the asset paying Y1 at time t+1. In period t+1, the firm 
has income Y1, but the asset depreciates to have zero value. Consequently tax is paid on 














1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
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⇒ − = + − + − 
−
⇒ = =
+ − − +
 
 
Clearly the value of the asset is independent of the tax rate. The taxes paid by the firm are 
1 (1 )Y rτ +  capital gains tax in period t and *1 2 1( ) (1 )tY V r Y rτ τ− = +  income tax in period 
t+1, or a total of 1Yτ . This is the same total tax that is paid under the income tax system, 
although most of the tax is paid in period t rather than period t+1 so the present value of 
the tax payments is higher.  
 
Example 2: An asset that returns a constant dividend (asset 3).  
Let *3tV be the value at time t of the asset paying D in each period from t+1 onwards. The 
value of the asset is constant through time: therefore no capital gains tax is paid at time 
t+1or thereafter. * The value of the asset satisfies the following equation: 
* * *
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+ −
  −
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− −
⇒ = = =
+ − − −
 
 
The value of the asset is independent of the tax rate. As the initial investment creates an 
asset with value 3 /V D r= , the firm pays capital gains tax 3 /V D rτ τ= at time t. 
Subsequently income tax τD is paid on the dividend each period, but no further capital 
gains tax are paid as the value of the asset is constant. Total taxes increase.  
 
*This result is derived from an iterated forward expansion of the equation for V*3t in terms of V*3t+1. The 
derivation in the more general case with inflation is provided in Box 2.  
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 a tax on nominal capital gains.55 Suppose all dividends increase at rate π, and i is the 
nominal interest rate, (1 ) (1 )(1 )i r π+ = + + . Recalculating cases (i) to (iii), assuming the 
dividend increases at the inflation rate: 
 
(i) 1 0( ) (1 ) (1 ) (0)V Y Vτ τ τ= − = −          (7) 
 
(ii) 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )( ) (0)








− + − +
= =
+ − + −

















+ −∑   
(1 )(1 ) 1
(1 (1 )) 1 (1 ) (1 (1 ))
















      (9) 
 
Compared to the values when there is no tax or inflation, the incentive to produce 
infinitely lived assets increases substantially as the inflation rate increases: 
3 1









        (10) 
For example, suppose the real interest rate is 3% and the tax rate is 33%. In the absence 
of a capital gains tax, the additional income from investing in infinitely lived assets rather 
producing for the present and investing the proceeds ranges between 49% when inflation 
is zero to 186% when the inflation rate is 3%.  
 
If nominal capital gains were subject to tax, the distortion induced by income tax would 
be corrected and the after-tax returns of investments with different horizons would be 
equalized – this result is shown for the same two asset classes in Box 2. It should be 
noted, of course, that if a capital gains tax were applied to nominal capital gains the 
effective tax rate on the real return from the investment will be significantly higher than 
the statutory income tax rate, just as real interest income is currently subject to effective 
tax rates that are significantly higher than the statutory rate. If a capital gains tax were 
                                                 
55 This is the case considered by Samuelson. However, his logic extends to the case that only real interest 
earnings are taxed, in which case a capital gains tax should only be applied to real capital gains.  
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applied to real capital gains, and real interest were taxed, the same neutrality results 
would be achieved but real capital income would be taxed at the statutory rate.  
 
The above analysis assumes a ‘pure’ accrual-based capital gains tax is introduced to 
correct the distortions introduced by an income tax. In the real world, it is likely that the 
tax would be realization based and introduced with significant exemptions, negating 
some of the advantages of a capital gains tax. This of course does not detract from the 
primary points: an income tax applied to capital income induces significant distortions in 
the pattern of after-tax returns of different asset types, that these distortions are 
magnified by inflation, and that these distortions can be corrected by an appropriately 




Box 2: The effect of a capital gains tax on asset values with inflation.  
This box derives the effect of a capital gains tax on the value of two assets considered in Box 1 
when there is inflation. The nominal interest rate is i, (1 ) (1 )(1 )i r π+ = + + .  
 
(i) An asset returning a sum Y1(1+π)  in period t+1.  
Let *2tV be the value at time t of the asset paying Y1(1+π) at time t+1. In period t+1, the firm has 
income Y1(1+π), but the asset depreciates to have zero value. Tax is paid on the income minus 
the loss in value of the asset. The value of the asset satisfies the following equation: 
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* 1 1 1
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As this is the value of the asset when there is no tax or inflation, the value of the asset is 
independent of the tax rate or the inflation rate. 
 
 (ii)An asset that returns an infinite stream of dividends that is constant in real terms.  
Let *3tV be the value at time t of the asset paying a sequence of dividends {D(1+π), D(1+π)
2, 
D(1+π)3….}. (The dividends are constant in real terms and increase in nominal terms at rate π.)   
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This is also the value of the asset when there is no tax or inflation. 
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Appendix 2: Regression results from section 3 
 
A2.1  The rent/price ratio 
In section 3.2 it was argued that there is no long term linear relationship between the 
rent/price ratio and the real interest rate. The evidence for this statement is a sequence 
of regressions showing that the rent/price ratio and the real interest rate are not 
cointegrated. The evidence is presented in two parts. In the first part, it is shown that 
when only the rent/price ratio and the real interest rate but no other variables are tested 
for cointegration, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the two series are not 
cointegrated. In the second part, cointegration is tested when two additional variables, 
lagged changes in the house price index and lagged changes in the inflation rate, are 
added to the analysis.  
 
Table A2:1 presents the regression results when only the rent/ price ratio and the real 
interest rate but no other variables are analysed. The table has two parts, presenting 
results for 1975 to 2014 and 1990 to 2014 respectively. The table shows the results of (i) 
unit root tests for the rent/price ratio and the real interest rate; (ii) a linear regression 
between the rent/price ratio and the real interest rate, which generates the residual t̂e ; 
and (iii) a linear regression between t̂e  and 1t̂e − .
56 For both periods, it is not possible to 
reject the hypothesis (at the 5% significance level) that the real interest rate and the 
rent/price ratio have unit roots. Nor is it possible to reject the hypothesis that the 
residual of the ordinary least squares regression between the variables has a unit root; as 
such the two variables are not cointegrated.  
 
The second set of tests is complicated because the real house price series not only 
appears to have a unit root, but quarterly changes in real house prices are strongly and 
positively autocorrelated. For the whole period, 1975 – 2014, the following equation 




t t tHP HP e−∆ = − + ∆ +  2 0.45 2.11 159R DW n= = =  
A very similar regression was estimated for the sub-period 1990 – 2014.
                                                 
56 This is the Engle-Granger test; more sophisticated tests give similar results. 
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The size of this correlation makes it likely that there is a strong negative correlation 
changes in the rent/price ratio and changes in real house prices in the previous period. 
This is because an increase in house prices in one period is usually followed by an 
increase in house prices in the subsequent period, and will reduce the rent-price ratio 
unless there is an equal increase in rents.  
 
One method of testing whether there is a long term (cointegrating) relationship between 
real interest rates, real house prices, and the rent/price ratio is to test whether an error-
correction model can be fitted to the data (Ericsson and MacKinnon 2002). If there is a 
long term relationship between interest rates and the rent/price ratio, the coefficient 
0β in the following regression should be statistically significant, 
 
0 1 0 1 1 1t t i t t t i t i t
i i
RP r X RP r X eα α α β β β− − −∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + + + +∑ ∑  
where Xt is a set of additional long term variables, in this case the average increase in real 
house prices over the previous three years, and the average inflation rate over the 
previous three years. The regression results are shown in Table A2.2 for the periods 1975 
to 2014 and 1990 to 2014. In neither case is the coefficient β0 statistically significant, and 
thus the hypothesis that there is a long term linear relationship between the variables can 
be rejected.57  
 
A2.2  The mean size of newly constructed houses  
In section 3.3, it was claimed that it could not be proven that there is a long term 
cointegrating relationship between the mean size of newly constructed houses, real 
interest rates, and per capita GDP. To demonstrate this using data from 1989 to 2014, 
the following regressions were estimated: (i) a unit root regression showing that all three 
series have a unit root and (ii) an error correction model linking annual changes in the 
mean size of newly constructed houses to changes and in the interest rates and real GDP 
per capita and the lag of all of the three variables. The latter regression is an example of 
the Ericcson and MacKinnnon (2002) technique. Similar results are found when the 
Engle- Granger test was performed.  
The three unit root regressions are 
                                                 
57 The distribution of the t-ratio on the coefficient β1 is not standard, but was tabulated by Ericcson and 
MacKinnnon (2002). When there are 4 variables in the error correction regression, the asymptotic 
critical values at the 5% and 10% significance levels are -3.76 and -3.44 respectively.  
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Mean size of newly constructed houses: MBS (Mean building size) 
124.7 0.87
(8.5) (0.049)












= = = = −  
Real interest rates 
10.013 0.79
(0.008) (0.12)












= = = = −  
 
Real GDP per capita  
1600 1.00
(1240) (0.03)












= = = =  
The error correction regression is  
 
1 1 161.2 127 0.0006 0.41 119 0.0006
(22.6) (85) (0.0016) (0.13) (109) (0.0006)











= = = = −  
The test of the hypothesis that the three series are cointegrated is whether the coefficient 
β0 on the variable MBSt-1 is zero or not. This test is performed by calculating the ratio of 
the estimated coefficient to its estimated standard error. The coefficient is quite large 
( 0ˆ 0.41β = − ) but as the ratio equals -3.14  it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that 
the coefficient is zero and that there is no long-run cointegrating relationship between 
the three variables.  
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Table A2.1: Testing for cointegration between the real interest rate and the rent/price 
ratio.  
Regressions between the rent/price ratio index and the real mortgage rate, 
1975-2014 
Rent/price ratio(RP) 
0 1 1t t tRP RP eα α −= + +  
19.3 1.005
(9.3) (0.0076)

















Real mortgage (r) 
0 1 1t t tr r eα α −= + +  
10.0027 0.956
(0.0011) (0.0176)


















0 1t t tRP r eβ β= + +  
 
0 1 1t t te e uγ γ −= + +  
1146 793
(35) (574)




t t te e u−= − + +  



















Regressions between the rent/price ratio index and the real mortgage rate, 
1990-2014 
Rent/price ratio(RP) 
0 1 1t t tRP RP eα α −= + +  
110.1 1.002
(8.3) (0.0072)

















Real mortgage (r) 
0 1 1t t tr r eα α −= + +  
10.0032 0.942
(0.002) (0.031)


















0 1t t tRP r eβ β= + +  
 
0 1 1t t te e uγ γ −= + +  
434 10954
(81) (1240)




t t te e u−= − + +  



























Table A2.2: Using the Ericcson-MacKinnon ECM test to test for cointegration between 
the rent/price ratio, the real interest rate, the lagged average house price change, and the  





1975 - 2014 
 tRP∆  
1990 - 2014 
 coefficient s.e. t-ratio coefficient s.e. t-ratio 
Constant -9.6 9.8 -1.0 -2.9 11.4 0.3 
tr∆  129 246 0.5 1056 380 2.8 
3*
tHP∆  -860 208 -4.1 -574 249 -2.3 
3*
tπ∆  -1251 954 -1.3 -1742 1850 -0.9 
1tRP−  -0.006 0.009 -0.7 -0.03 0.012 -2.4 
1tr −  115 104 1.1 678 264 2.6 
3*
1tHP−  -40 51 -0.8 -119 60 -2.0 
3*
1tπ −  84 51 1.7 -369 307 -1.2 
R2 0.17  0.27  
Nobs 146 98 
DW 1.70 1.84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
